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ARTICLES 
TAX AUTHORITY AS REGULATOR AND 
EQUITY HOLDER:  HOW SHAREHOLDERS’ 
CONTROL RIGHTS COULD BE ADAPTED TO 
SERVE THE TAX AUTHORITY 
ILYA BEYLIN† 
INTRODUCTION 
There has been some hullabaloo about governments 
worldwide taking equity stakes in troubled banks1 and car 
companies.2  The surprised and at times outraged tone of the 
hullabaloo reveals a broadly shared and incorrect belief that 
governments do not already have equity stakes in enterprise.  
Governments, including our own, regularly take equity stakes in 
distressed corporations.3  In fact, governments have a substantial 
 
† J.D., 2008, University of Chicago; B.A.S., 2003, Stanford University. This 
Article has been much improved by criticism received from Douglas Baird, Clark 
Durant, Jesse Edgerton, Christine Graham, Ed Kleinbard, Anup Malani, Sam 
Sellers, Alex Raskolnikov, and David Weisbach, and from participants at talks at 
which it was presented. 
1 For an explanation of the benefits to government involvement in bank 
restructuring, see AUGUSTIN LANDIER & KENICHI UEDA, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
THE ECONOMICS OF BANK RESTRUCTURING: UNDERSTANDING THE OPTIONS 9 (June 
4, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0912.pdf.  
2 See Conor Clarke, What Socialism Looks Like, THE ATLANTIC (June 3, 2009), 
http://correspondents.theatlantic.com/conor_clarke/2009/06/what_socialism_looks_ 
like.php (responding to some of the hullabaloo with a pie chart that compares 
publicly to privately managed assets in the United States, without accounting for 
the government’s equity position explained in this Article). 
3 Governments, including the U.S. government, have taken equity stakes in 
distressed firms for decades. For instance, the Public Benefits Guarantee 
Corporation (“PBGC”) interjects itself between insolvent employers and their 
pensioners, partly meeting defined benefit obligations to the pensioners and in 
exchange becoming a claimant in the employer’s bankruptcy. As a claimant, the 
PBGC receives assets of the bankrupt entity or an interest therein. On occasion, the 
interest is that of a shareholder. See, e.g., U.S. Sees Profit on Airline Loan Guarantee 
Program, USA TODAY (Nov. 30, 2006), http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2006-
01-30-loan-profits_x.htm (discussing the PBGC’s equity stakes in the reorganized 
U.S. Airways and United airlines). The government has also occupied an exclusive 
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equity stake in each corporation, distressed or not, via the tax 
authority’s claim on a fraction of corporate income.  Some degree 
of government ownership and control of enterprise is an 
inevitable consequence of a functional income tax.4  This 
observation not only challenges popular notions that recent 
direct investments by the government in public corporations5 
 
ownership and control role in the resolution of failed banks. The present statutory 
scheme under which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) may 
liquidate or operate failed banks has been in place for over thirty years. See 
12 U.S.C. § 1821 (2006). 
4 In 1945, Evsey D. Domar and Richard A. Musgrave explained that “[b]y 
imposing an income tax on the investor, Congress appoints the Treasury as his 
partner who will always share in his gains, but whose share in his losses will depend 
upon the investor’s ability to offset losses against other income.” Evsey D. Domar & 
Richard A. Musgrave, Income Taxation and Risk Taking, 23 TAXES 60, 60 (1945). 
The insight that “the income tax grants the tax authority economic rights in firms 
comparable to those enjoyed by shareholders” has been developed at length by public 
finance and corporate finance literature investigating the effect the tax authority’s 
interest has on firms’ risk preferences. For example, in 1985, Richard C. Green and 
Eli Talmor elaborated a model showing the conflicting incentives progressive tax 
rates created for and against risk taking. See Richard C. Green & Eli Talmor, The 
Structure and Incentive Effects of Corporate Tax Liabilities, 40 J. FIN. 1095, 1095–96 
(1985). Legal scholars working in the tax field have recognized the similarity 
between shareholders’ and the tax authority’s economic rights. See Louis Kaplow, 
Taxation and Risk Taking: A General Equilibrium Perspective, 47 NAT’L TAX. J. 789, 
797 n.5 (1994); Herwig J. Schlunk, The Cashless Corporate Tax, 55 TAX L. REV. 1, 1 
(2001). Working from that insight in 2000, Herwig J. Schlunk developed a proposal 
to replace the corporate income tax with a “ ‘cashless corporate tax’ (CCT).” Id. The 
proposal expressly sought to do away with subsidies accomplished through the 
Internal Revenue Code (the “Tax Code”) in the form of favorable tax rates for certain 
forms of enterprise, which it divided into three categories: (1) those intended by 
Congress, (2) those representing administrative compromises, and (3) those 
unintended. See id. at 5, 7. The resulting uniform tax rate would be operationalized 
through virtual nonvoting shares in the taxpayer-corporation. See id. at 33–36. The 
proposal assumed a world without agency costs, where firms were run to maximize 
true economic income to shareholders. Id. at 2 n.1. By tying shareholders’ returns to 
the tax authority’s returns, the CCT would end shareholders’ efforts to reduce tax 
liability as any such reduction would proportionately reduce their own returns. 
Whereas the CCT proposal advocates replacement of the tax authority’s economic 
rights with those of shareholders, this Article instead considers whether it would be 
worthwhile to add shareholders’ control rights to the tax authority’s economic rights. 
5 For example, the government has taken equity positions and/or made loans to 
General Motors, Chrysler, AIG, Bank of America, and Citigroup. See DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, TARP TRANSACTIONS REP. 1, 14–17 (2009), available at http:// 
www.financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/transactionsreport_08042009. 
pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2010) (summarizing cumulative government investments 
under the Troubled Asset Relief Program and redemptions by the investees for the 
period ending July 31, 2009).  
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represent adventurous departures from the status quo6 but also 
prompts a puzzle:  If the government’s economic interest 
resembles that of a shareholder, why is it denied the control 
rights shareholders typically enjoy? 
The traditional taxonomy of participants in a firm’s capital 
structure divides them between debtholders and shareholders.7  
The former sit atop the capital structure, removed by bankruptcy 
priority and contractually fixed interest payments from the risks 
and returns the latter face below.8  Differences between 
debtholders’ and shareholders’ economic interests lead to 
conflicts over business strategy.  Control rights paired to 
debtholders’ and shareholders’ economic interests are designed to 
resolve these potential conflicts without hindering productive 
efforts of the firm.  The primary puzzle prompting this Article is 
how—in the absence of control rights traditionally afforded to 
shareholders—the tax authority protects its interests.9 
The tax authority stands in two distinct positions vis-à-vis 
each firm.10  First, the tax authority promotes the government’s 
 
6 See, e.g., Hugh Hewitt, Just Say No to Government Motors and Obamacars, 
WASH. EXAM’R (June 1, 2009), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/ 
opinion/columns/Hugh-Hewitt/Just-say-no-to-Government-Motors-and-Obamacars-
46615602.html (“The very idea of a socialized American car company ought to cause 
millions of Americans to reject the idea of doing their car shopping at those 
venues.”).  
7 Financial engineers have irradiated these basic categories to produce a 
bewildering menagerie of interests, which have been studied at length in financial 
and legal literature. See generally THE CREDIT DERIVATIVES HANDBOOK: GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVES, INNOVATIONS, AND MARKET DRIVERS (Greg N. Gregoriou & Paul Ali 
eds., 2008) (discussing contemporary strains of credit derivatives); Edward D. 
Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial Innovation’s Newest Challenge to 
the Tax System, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1319, 1322–27 (1991) (discussing the evolution of 
equity derivatives). 
8 See O’Hare v. Comm’r, 641 F.2d 83, 86–87 (2d Cir. 1981) (explaining that the 
taxpayer should be treated as a creditor rather than as an equityholder in a venture 
because the taxpayer was not exposed to the risk of the venture); Comm’r v. O.P.P. 
Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1935) (“The shareholder is an adventurer in 
the corporate business; he takes the risk, and profits from success. The creditor, in 
compensation for not sharing the profits, is to be paid independently of the risk of 
success, and gets a right to dip into the capital when the payment date arrives.”). 
9 See Kaplow, supra note 4 (“By owning nonvoting shares through taxation—in 
the past, shares approaching or exceeding 50 percent—rather than directly, the 
government is subject to the other shareholders diverting proceeds to themselves at 
the expense of the silent partner—i.e., through tax avoidance and evasion.”). 
10 Revenue raising and regulation may not be distinct ends but rather distinct 
means. The government may use revenues to finance its regulatory agenda or may 
forego revenue through favorable tax rates that encourage taxpayers to pursue its 
regulatory agenda. If a sufficient amount of congressional intelligence is assumed, 
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interest as regulator.  It does so by imposing relatively lower 
rates on congressionally favored forms of enterprise.  Second, the 
tax authority serves a revenue raising function, which is 
accomplished through a right to share in firms’ revenues.11  That 
right to share in firms’ revenues is similar to that possessed by 
the firms’ shareholders.  Specifically, both share in the residual 
of a firm’s earnings after expenses have been paid.12  But while 
the economic rights of shareholders and the tax authority show 
profound similarities, the control rights afforded to the latter 
take a drastically different form from those afforded to the 
former.  Unlike a shareholder, the tax authority cannot vote for 
representatives on the board of directors, cannot threaten 
management with a transfer of its interest to those more able to 
impose discipline, and cannot align management’s interests with 
its own by sharing a portion of tax receipts with them.  Thus, it 
lacks three basic tools shareholders use to focus management on 
the interests of equity: corporate democracy, the market for 
control, and the market for management.13  Moreover, directors 
and officers do not owe the tax authority fiduciary duties that 
protect other interest holders from their disfavor.  Having 
identified that shareholders and the tax authority have similar 
economic interests in a firm, but that the latter lacks control 
rights possessed by the former, Part II considers three questions.   
 
then the contours of the Tax Code will reflect legislative judgment as to which 
projects are more effectively delegated to private actors. 
11 Though this Article focuses its discussion on corporations, its reasoning 
generally applies to other business entities. If the tax authority’s control rights in 
corporations were in excess of those in businesses taxed as pass-through entities, 
incorporators would face higher incentives to avoid subchapter C. The deadweight 
loss to tax avoidance prompted by corporate taxation has been extensively 
addressed. See, e.g., Jane G. Gravelle & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, The Incidence and 
Efficiency Costs of Corporate Taxation When Corporate and Noncorporate Firms 
Produce the Same Good, 97 J. POL. ECON. 749, 749 (1989); Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason 
& Roger H. Gordon, How Much Do Taxes Discourage Incorporation?, 52 J. FIN. 477, 
477–78 (1997). But few, if any, of the control rights typically possessed by 
shareholders could not also be adapted in favor of the tax authority in pass-through 
contexts. 
12 See Green & Talmor, supra note 4, at 1096; Schlunk, supra note 4.  
13 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 675, 677 (2007) (critiquing theories of managerial discipline through 
shareholder democracy); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate 
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965) (developing the disciplinary effect of the 
mergers and acquisitions market on management); Stephen A. Ross, The Economic 
Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 134, 134 (1973) 
(developing the disciplinary effect of compensation structure on management). 
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First, does the tax authority need distinct control rights?  If 
taxes served solely the goal of generating revenues, the tax 
authority could simply be granted nonvoting common shares in 
every corporation and rely on assertive shareholders to safeguard 
its interest.14  As is, however, taxes are designed to do more than 
raise revenues—they are also used to encourage congressionally 
favored behavior.15  In other words, the tax authority as interest 
holder does not only care about how much the taxpayer earns but 
also about how the taxpayer earns it.  As a result, the interests of 
shareholders and the tax authority are not always aligned, as the 
latter operates under statutory directives that balance raising 
revenue with encouraging congressionally favored enterprise.  If 
it were not allowed distinct control rights, the tax authority could 
not steer firm strategy when private and public policy diverged. 
Second, if the tax authority requires distinct control rights, 
why not grant it the same rights as those possessed by 
shareholders?  Part II proposes a series of alternative designs to 
the contemporary tax system that adapt safeguards afforded to 
common shareholders to serve the tax authority.  The practical 
and theoretical consequences of adopting these alternatives are 
discussed.  While both a market of control and a market for 
management could be implemented to benefit the tax authority, 
neither could, without more, simultaneously accommodate the 
tax authority’s regulatory and financial goals.  For example, if 
the tax authority were allowed to auction off its tax receipts or 
reward management when firms pay more in taxes, tax revenues 
would improve, but the incentives imposed by differential tax 
rates to pursue congressionally favored behaviors would weaken.  
The same would be true if fiduciary duties were owed to the tax 
authority.   
The third question is, given that the tax authority lacks the 
legal protections provided to shareholders, how is its distinct 
economic interest in the firm safeguarded?  The control rights of 
the tax authority take the form of a mandatory dividend 
calculated based on the source of income as well as its amount.  
This substitute is not surprising.  Firms in jurisdictions where 
 
14 See Schlunk, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
15 See Edward D. Kleinbard, Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on Taxation, Address 
Before the Chicago-Kent College of Law Federal Tax Institute: Rethinking Tax 
Expenditures (May 1, 2008), in STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., 
A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 9 (Comm. Print 2008). 
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shareholders’ control rights are otherwise weak are required to 
pay mandatory dividends to ensure earnings are distributed to 
shareholders rather than misappropriated by their fiduciaries.  
The novel feature is the variation in effective tax rates, which 
seeks joint maximization of the competing goals of revenue and 
regulation.  Part III explains how in addition to being an effective 
substitute for traditional control rights, the design of the 
mandatory dividend provides lawmakers with a series of levers 
that may be used to set risk policy across private enterprise.16  
Because the tax authority shares in the income from a period but 
does not fully share in the loss, the tax system poses a 
disincentive to risk seeking.  The strength of that disincentive 
can be affected through changes in the tax rate or the ability of 
taxpayers to carryover losses between years. 
I. CORPORATE FINANCE IN A NUTSHELL17 
Every corporation begins its life as a legal abstraction—a 
certificate of incorporation issued from the office of a secretary of 
state.18  Before becoming self-sufficient through operations that 
produce enough cash to cover its expenses, a corporation survives 
on money raised from investors.19  Corporate finance studies the 
choices firms face when financing their operations and the 
consequences of those choices.20  Firms offer instruments that  
 
 
 
 
16 See generally Green & Talmor, supra note 4, at 1103–06 (explaining how a 
progressive tax reduces risk taking by a solvent firm). 
17 Those familiar with basic issues in corporate finance are encouraged to skip 
Part I.   
18 The office issuing corporate charters and the procedure to receive them vary 
by state. For example, in Delaware, charters are issued by the Secretary of State 
and require the filing of a certificate of incorporation setting forth the name of the 
new corporation, its address and the address of its incorporator(s), its scope of 
business, and the number and par value of its authorized shares. DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, §§ 101–03 (2010). 
19 Firms with sufficient cash flows to cover their costs may also turn to outside 
financing, for example, to expand or redeem incumbent investors. 
20 See Eugene F. Fama, The Effects of a Firm’s Investment and Financing 
Decisions on the Welfare of Its Security Holders, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 272, 272–74 
(1978) (discussing assumptions under which the capital structure of a firm does not 
affect its value). 
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provide their purchasers claims to the firm’s assets.21  Investors 
purchase these instruments on the primary market, with the 
purchase price going to the firm.22   
Each instrument establishes a contract between its issuer 
and holder, which provides certain rights to the holder in 
consideration for the capital received by the issuer.  At the core of 
the bundle of rights provided for by an instrument are economic 
rights or those rights that define the holder’s share of the 
earnings of a firm and its assets in liquidation.  For example, 
prototypical debtholders have rights to receive a fixed stream of 
payments and, in liquidation, be repaid in full before any 
payments are made to shareholders.  Prototypical shareholders 
may receive dividends from retained earnings so long as 
sufficient cash remains to pay debts as they come due and, in 
liquidation, have rights to what assets remain after debtholders 
have been satisfied.  The instruments that a firm issues to 
acquire capital comprise the firm’s “capital structure.” 
In addition to conferring economic rights, instruments 
provide their holders with rights that safeguard those economic 
rights.  These safeguards are referred to as control rights.  
Control rights are primarily concerned with ensuring that 
management does not follow policies that maximize returns to 
other interest holders at the instrument holder’s expense.  As 
this Part will explain in more detail, the business decisions that 
provide optimal returns to the investor depend on the investor’s 
position in the firm’s capital structure. 
A firm’s management team decides between business 
projects.23  Projects have a range of returns.  These ranges may 
be described by their mean or by their volatility.  Volatility of 
returns is frequently referred to as risk.24  Projects may have 
 
21 Some interests, such as those in a general partnership, also impose 
obligations. 
22 The proceeds received by the firm are purchase price less transaction costs. 
How instruments are marketed is the province of securities laws. After being sold on 
the primary market, instruments may be traded on the secondary market, though 
the gain or loss realized through such trades does not directly inure to the firm. 
23 Part I.B discusses the separation of decisionmaking power between 
shareholders, directors, and officers in more detail. For now, the individuals who 
make the decisions as to which projects to pursue are referred to as the management 
team. 
24 Risk may be decomposed into firm specific and systematic risk. See generally 
HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF 
INVESTMENTS 102–15 (Blackwell 1991) (1959) (explaining how portfolio 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 851 (2010) 
858 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:851   
lower or higher mean returns than other projects.  Projects may 
also be riskier or less risky than other projects.  A firm’s 
management team must decide between projects that have 
varying risk and return profiles.  In general, debtholders will 
prefer lower risk projects and shareholders will prefer higher 
return projects.25  The preferences may be understood by 
returning to the prototypical claimholders introduced above.  
Once the firm has sufficient assets to meet debtholders’ claims, 
debtholders would prefer for the firm to reduce risk no matter 
what such reduction would cost in terms of returns.26  
Shareholders, on the other hand, may sacrifice low risk returns 
when such returns would not provide the firm with sufficient 
assets to meet debtholders’ claims.  Thus, if either debtholders or 
shareholders had exclusive control over selecting a firm’s 
projects, the firm would end up making inefficient tradeoffs 
between risk and return.27   
A firm engaged in financing is an impartial creature.28  It 
cares only to raise the most capital, without caring from whom it 
 
diversification reduces performance volatility). The former may be reduced through 
diversification of investments across firms. Diversification imposes administrative 
costs, as even the most passive index has to be rebalanced at the expense of 
brokerage fees. Moreover, diversification greatly reduces firm specific risks but does 
not wholly eliminate them. While in the abstract, it may be more correct to discuss 
the conflicts of interest between stakeholders as to nondiversifiable risk—as other 
risk could be neutralized through diversification—except where the distinction 
should be emphasized, this Article will leave risk unqualified, and arguably be 
simpler and truer to reality, where diversification is neither free nor perfect. 
25 See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An 
Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118–19 (1979) (explaining conflicts 
of interest between debtholders and shareholders as to dividend payments, claim 
dilution, asset substitution, and underinvestment). 
26 Management may either act to further the interests of other claimholders at 
the expense of shareholders or to further its own interests at the expense of 
shareholders. The latter threat may be ameliorated by the participation of 
debtholders in the capital structure. There is evidence for the proposition that 
management tends to pursue suboptimal strategies that reduce diversifiable risk at 
the expense of revenue. See Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Does Corporate 
Ownership Structure Affect Its Strategy Towards Diversification?, 20 STRATEGIC 
MGMT. J. 1063, 1064 (1999) (reviewing studies before concluding that management 
tends to prefer suboptimal levels of risk reduction); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs 
of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 324 
(1986) (explaining how reduction of retained earnings through debt financing may 
increase managerial discipline). 
27 See Fama, supra note 20, at 282. 
28 See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Optimal Security Design, 1 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 229, 229–30 (1988) (“An important question concerns how . . . securities 
should be optimally designed; in other words, how should the payoffs to a security be 
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raises capital.  When a firm seeks to raise capital, it is in the 
firm’s interest to commit to a corporate policy of pursuing 
projects with maximum risk adjusted returns.  As discussed 
above, instruments provide their holders claims on the issuing 
firm’s assets.  A firm’s assets, in turn, consist of the sum of 
proceeds from financing and net returns.  Thus aggregate claims 
to a firm’s assets become more valuable as a firm’s net returns 
increase, so a firm that can promise higher risk adjusted returns 
faces a lower cost of capital.29  To decrease cost of capital, control 
rights accompanying instruments have been designed to avoid 
the troubling possibility that a firm will forego a business plan 
that maximizes aggregate returns because its management is 
dominated by one group or another.  The remainder of this Part 
reviews the economic rights and safeguards enjoyed by 
prototypical debtholders and equityholders.30 
A. The Economic and Control Rights of Typical Debtholders 
A debt instrument entitles its holder to recover the principal, 
or the purchase price of the instrument, by the maturity date of 
the instrument.31  In addition to the principal, the issuing firm 
will pay the holder interest on the principal to compensate the 
holder for the time value of the principal as well as risk.32  Thus a 
 
allocated across states of nature in order to maximize the amount the issuer 
receives?”); Arnoud W. A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, Security Design, 48 J. FIN. 1349, 
1369 (1993) (“The perspective in our theory of security design is that a firm will 
partition its total asset cash flows into different claims because this maximizes its 
expected revenue.”). 
29 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 
J.L. & ECON. 395, 396 (1983) (explaining that stakeholders in a firm only receive 
voting rights “to the extent those rights are beneficial to the whole enterprise”). 
30 The next Part reviews the economic and control rights of the tax authority. It 
is important to note that while a firm will raise more capital on net if it accompanies 
the instruments it issues with control rights designed to increase after-tax risk 
adjusted returns, the firm does not similarly benefit from control rights that 
maximize pretax returns. 
31 See Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968) 
(discussing the tax consequences of treating an instrument as either debt or equity 
and providing a multifactor balancing test—which includes “the relative position of 
the obligees as to other creditors regarding the payment of interest and principal” 
and the “contingency [of] the obligation to repay”—to evaluate whether the 
instrument should be treated as debt or equity for tax purposes). 
32 A debtholder’s risk exposure may be decomposed into interest rate risk, 
counterparty default risk, reinvestment risk, call risk, prepayment risk, and 
purchasing power risk. For an explanation of the risks faced by a debtholder, see 
KENNETH R. KAPNER & JOHN F. MARSHALL, THE SWAPS HANDBOOK 56–69 (1992). 
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debtholder’s economic rights are usually limited to a return of 
principal and interest.33  So long as a firm’s expected earnings are 
sufficient to satisfy its principal and interest obligations, its 
debtholders will be unwilling to revise business strategy in a way 
that increases the likelihood that they will not recover their 
principal and interest—no matter how much additional profit the 
firm may be expected to make as a result of such revisions. 
Safeguards attending debtholders’ interests are designed to 
protect the fixed returns they are due, without excessively 
interfering with the aggregate interests of the firm.  First, 
debtholders may enjoy security interests in the firm’s assets.  
These security interests provide collateral in case the firm’s 
income is insufficient to satisfy principal34 or interest 
obligations.35  So long as the value of the collateral remains above 
the amount due on the loan, the creditor does not incur the 
debtor’s default risk.36  
Second, debt contracts frequently include covenants.  Some 
covenants require the firm to meet or maintain accounting ratios 
or other performance targets.37  Other covenants prohibit the 
firm from selling its operating assets, incurring additional debt, 
or otherwise materially changing its business or financial 
 
33 Interest payments need not be fixed. For example, the interest due on a bond 
may vary with the London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”), which is the rate that 
banks offer when making loans to other banks. See What’s in a Number? Donald 
MacKenzie on the Importance of Libor, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Sept. 25, 2008, at 11. 
Whether an instrument will be treated as debt by the tax authority, however, does 
partly turn on the determinant of interest payments. See Fin Hay Realty Co., 398 
F.2d at 697. 
34 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2006) (providing secured status to lienholders and 
those holding setoff rights); id. § 725 (providing for the distribution of property 
subject to a lien to the lienholder before any other distribution of the estate’s 
property takes place). 
35 See id. § 506(b) (providing for limited satisfaction of postpetition interest from 
the security interest).   
36 The law of secured transactions is concerned with how and when security 
interests in collateral are established. See U.C.C. § 9-109 (2010) (discussing subject 
matter of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code); see also Ronald J. Mann, 
Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. L. REV. 159, 220 
(1997) (reporting empirical findings on debtor’s recourse to their rights to liquidate 
collateral). 
37 See, e.g., Freeland v. Iridium World Commc’ns, Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65–
66 (D.D.C. 2008) (tripping of performance based covenants put Iridium World 
Communications into default).   
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 851 (2010) 
2010] TAX AUTHORITY 861 
structure.38  If the debtor breaches a covenant, the creditor 
usually has the right to accelerate repayment.39  Covenants 
provide both flexibility and deterrence for the benefit of 
creditors.40  Performance based covenants provide creditors with 
early warning that the debtor is approaching an area where 
shareholders cease to bear the downside.41  When covenants are 
tripped, the threat of acceleration allows the creditor to 
renegotiate the instrument’s terms ex post rather than having to 
attempt to provide for all contingencies ex ante.42  Covenants that 
prevent substantial changes in the firm’s operations such as 
mergers, spin-offs, and entry into new lines of business help 
ensure that the risk profile of a firm is not radically altered post-
issuance.  Otherwise, a workaday issuer could transform into a 
tech startup with proceeds from creditors who had purchased the 
debt at an interest rate calibrated for the more sober business.  
In short, covenants are designed to safeguard debtholders from 
management without involving them in management. 
 
 
 
38 See William W. Bratton, Bond Covenants and Creditor Protection: Economics 
and Law, Theory and Practice, Substance and Process, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 39, 
49–62 (2006) (providing an overview of commonly used debt covenants). 
39 As an alternative to accelerating the principal, tripping a covenant may 
increase the interest rate. See Vipal Monga, Return of the Covenants, THE DEAL, 
Feb. 23, 2009, at 4:21 (“Covenants can take many forms, but they are essentially 
restrictive clauses in loan agreements that force borrowers to meet specific 
benchmarks or keep them from incurring debt beyond a set level.”). 
40 See Harry DeAngelo et al., Asset Liquidity, Debt Covenants, and Managerial 
Discretion in Financial Distress: The Collapse of L.A. Gear, 64 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 5 
(2002) (describing the use of debt covenants in a case study of the financial distress 
of L.A. Gear and concluding that “debt covenants sometimes constrain managerial 
discretion more effectively than does the pressure to meet cash interest obligations”). 
41 See, e.g., VFB LLC v. Campbell Soup Co., 482 F.3d 624, 628 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(providing an example of an earnings based covenant). See generally Douglas G. 
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate 
Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209 (2006). 
42 See HILARY ROSENBERG, THE VULTURE INVESTORS 17–18 (Wiley 2000) 
(describing the ability of distressed investors to use the Bankruptcy Code’s voting 
rules to achieve control positions—known as “negative control”—in debtors); Alex 
Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 601, 654–55 (2007) (observing that lenders frequently renegotiate strict 
covenants); Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Control Rights and Capital Structure: 
An Empirical Investigation 23 (Aug. 11, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=962131 (providing empirical 
evidence showing that creditors use covenant violation to reduce firms’ debt load). 
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Third and fourth, debtholders benefit from the right to 
transfer their instruments to other investors and from fiduciary 
rights.43  Neither right is unique to debtholders and both will be 
discussed at length in the following Subpart on shareholders.44   
B. The Economic and Control Rights of Typical Shareholders 
Common shares entitle their holders to the “residual” of a 
firm or those assets that remain after all other interest holders 
have been satisfied.  The residual is composed of the sum of the 
firm’s proceeds from equity issuances and net income.45  The 
residual is reduced to the extent it is distributed.46  A firm’s net 
income is the difference between its gross income and expenses.  
Gross income includes, for example, revenues a firm receives 
from selling its inventory or interest it is paid on bonds it holds.  
Expenses include, for example, the costs of acquiring the 
inventory sold, rent for the store space, and wages paid to 
employees.  From the perspective of shareholders, expenses also 
include interest and taxes due, as these reduce the net income 
available to shareholders.  It is important to note that current  
 
 
 
43 See VFB, 482 F.3d at 635–36 (discussing directors’ duty of loyalty to creditors 
where a company is insolvent). 
44 For reasons that will be explained in Part II.B.3, debtholders only benefit 
from fiduciary rights when the firm enters the zone of insolvency.   
45 A well known formulation by Robert Haig and Henry Simons defines net 
income as the algebraic sum of: “(1) the market value of rights exercised in 
consumption [by the taxpayer] and (2) the change in the value of the [taxpayer’s] 
store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question.” 
See Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL 
INCOME TAXATION 50 (photo reprint 1980) (1938). This definition is inadequate 
because not all value is protected by legal rights, and moreover, as every lawyer 
knows, the exact scope of legal rights is difficult to determine precisely. See, e.g., 
Chris William Sanchirico, Progressivity and Potential Income: Measuring the Effect 
of Changing Work Patterns on Income Tax Progressivity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1551, 
1551 (2008) (explaining that changes in the composition of off-market labor supply 
during the 1990s were sufficient to countervail progressive amendments of the Tax 
Code); see also Raskolnikov, supra note 42, at 602 (2007) (explaining how norms are 
relied on in structuring transactions to reduce tax liability). 
46 For example, if a firm is initially capitalized through an equity issuance of 
$50, operates for a year incurring a net loss of $30, makes net income of $50 in the 
second year, and breaks even in the third year, declaring dividends of $40, the 
residual of the firm will be $50 at the outset of year one, $20 at the end of year one, 
$70 at the end of year two, and $30 at the end of year three.  
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retained earnings do not fully measure a common shareholder’s 
economic interest in the firm, as shares also entitle their holders 
to future net income. 
Financial statements help investors track and compare 
financial positions of firms.47  To assist comparison, accountants 
have developed rules for when income and expenses are 
recognized and how they are measured.48  For example, generally 
accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) govern49 how firms 
report their condition in financial statements disclosed pursuant 
to the Securities Act of 193350 and the Exchange Act of 1934.51  
Financial statements do not fully reflect the value of 
shareholders’ equity because they only reflect past and present 
net income. 
When a firm has insufficient cash to pay its expenses, the 
firm becomes insolvent and the interests of common shareholders 
become extinguished.52  Because shareholders receive as little if 
 
47 See David I. Walker, Financial Accounting and Corporate Behavior, 64 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 927, 974 (2007) (“The primary aim of financial accounting is to 
provide relevant, reliable, consistent and comparable financial information to the 
capital markets in order to ensure efficient allocation of resources.”). 
48 See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Facts About FASB, 
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176154526495 (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2010) (“Such standards are important to the efficient functioning of the 
economy because decisions about the allocation of resources rely heavily on credible, 
concise, and understandable financial information.”). 
49 See 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2006); id. § 78m(b)(1); see also The Roles of the SEC 
and the FASB in Establishing GAAP: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Capital 
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on 
Financial Services, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Robert K. Herdman, Chief 
Accountant, U.S. Securities & Exchange Comm.), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/051402tsrkh.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2010). 
50 See 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a).  
51 See id. § 78m(b)(1). 
52 It is useful to distinguish financial from economic insolvency. See BARRY E. 
ADLER ET AL., CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 26–27 (4th ed. 
2007); Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial (Not Economic) 
Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions That Became Distressed, 53 
J. FIN. 1443, 1444–45 (1998) (discussing measurement difficulty in distinguishing 
financial from economic distress). Financial insolvency describes a firm that meets 
distress solely because claims become due sooner than cash becomes available to 
meet them; in other words, a firm that is distressed because of the timing rather 
than the amount of its cash flow. Id. at 1445. Economic insolvency describes a firm 
that is distressed because its revenues will not cover its costs. Id. at 1444–45. When 
a firm faces financial, rather than economic, insolvency, its shareholders may retain 
an interest in the residual. Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–84 (2006) (codifying chapter 7 
of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides for economic insolvency), with id. §§ 1101–
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the firm has not a cent as they do if the firm has exactly enough 
to satisfy all debtholders, they may be overly willing to risk bad 
making it worse—whereas debtholders are too willing to satisfy 
themselves with good instead of better.  Collateral, covenants, 
and the other safeguards discussed in the preceeding Subpart53 
limit these shareholder inclinations but do not affirmatively 
prescribe firm strategy.  While they ensure that debtholders’ 
fixed returns are not unreasonably endangered for the benefit of 
shareholders, they allow the firm to pursue shareholders’ 
interest, which generally consists of maximizing the residual.  
This Subpart discusses safeguards that ensure that management 
does pursue their interests.  These safeguards include the right 
to vote, the right to be informed, the right to transfer shares, as 
well as fiduciaries’ duties to the shareholders.  
1. Shareholder Democracy 
Governance in corporations takes the form of a 
constitutional, representative democracy.54  Incorporation 
requires the filing of a certificate of incorporation, or analogous 
charter document, with an officer of a state.  The certificate of 
incorporation may specify features of corporate governance, such 
as the number of initial directors, the percentage of outstanding 
shares required for a quorum at a meeting of shareholders or 
directors, and whether a supermajority is required for 
shareholder or director actions.55  The certificate of incorporation 
may also delegate the determination of these features to the 
corporate bylaws, which differ from the certificate in several 
 
174 (codifying chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides for reorganization 
from financial insolvency). 
53 See supra Part I.A. 
54 Voting rights attending share ownership have evolved over the course of the 
twentieth century from statutorily imposed egalitarianism, which required each 
share to confer one and only one vote on its holder, to the current system, which 
allows firms to issue classes of shares with distinct voting power. See LOUIS LOSS & 
JOEL SELIGMAN, 4 SECURITIES REGULATION 1831–49 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the 
evolution of restrictions on shareholder disenfranchisement); see also David L. 
Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of 
‘One Share, One Vote,’ 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8 (1970) (“By the end of the nineteenth 
century, then, statutory restrictions on the rule of one vote per share in business 
corporations had virtually disappeared, and it is now unusual to find a statutory 
reference to any formula other than one vote per share.”). 
55 The bylaws may also impose other restrictions. See, e.g., Brown v. Jacobs, 29 
F.2d 202, 202 (4th Cir. 1928) (enforcing restriction on executive compensation). 
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important respects.56  First, the bylaws are a contract between 
shareholders, whereas the certificate is a contract with the state.  
Second, the bylaws may be amended by the board of directors, 
whereas the certificate can only be amended with shareholder 
approval.  Though governance features may vary across 
corporations, and some corporations may fix features of 
governance permanently or subject only to amendment by 
shareholder supermajority, the separation of ownership and 
control is ubiquitous.57  Shareholders do not themselves 
ordinarily manage operations.58  In fact, they do not even manage 
those who manage operations.  Instead, officers of the company 
make business decisions, and directors reward or terminate 
officers based presumably in part on the results of those 
decisions.  Excepting requirements for shareholder approval of 
certain extraordinary actions such as mergers, liquidations, and 
sales of substantially all of the corporation’s assets,59 
shareholders influence the acts of the corporation only indirectly, 
through electing directors to represent their interests.60 
 
56 See Carr v. City of St. Louis, 9 Mo. 191, 191 (1845) (“It is a well settled 
principle of law, that the by-laws of a corporation must not be repugnant to its 
charter; the charter creates an artificial being, defines its powers, designates the 
purposes of its institution, and points out its mode of action. It is the fundamental 
law of the corporation, and is as a constitution to the body acting under and by it.”). 
57 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 41, at 1213–14 (“Shareholders, as 
residual claimants, serve as good proxies for all investors when the business is flush. 
They bear both the costs and benefits of the enterprise, but they do not actually 
control the day-to-day affairs of the business, ceding decision making over all but a 
handful of matters to directors and officers.”). Close corporations pose the exception 
to this general rule, allowing shareholders to manage the business of the corporation 
instead of the board of directors. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (2010). 
58 See, e.g., Trethewey v. Green River Gorge, Inc., 136 P.2d 999, 1010 (Wash. 
1943) (“The power of management of the corporate affairs and the power to contract 
so as to bind the corporation is vested primarily in the board of directors and not in 
the stockholders; the principal rights of the latter, in ordinary business or trading 
corporations, are to attend and vote at corporate meetings, to pass and amend by-
laws, to elect directors, to participate in dividends and profits, and to receive their 
proportionate shares of the corporate property or its proceeds upon dissolution and 
winding up of the corporation after payment of its debts.”).  
59 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 253, 271, 275 (2010) (setting forth 
shareholder approval requirements to carry out a merger, asset sale, and liquidation 
of a Delaware corporation, respectively). 
60 See id. § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be 
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be 
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”); 
Abercrombie v. Davies, 123 A.2d 893, 898 (Del. Ch. 1956) (holding that Delaware 
corporate law “does not permit actions or agreements by stockholders which would 
take all power from the board to handle matters of substantial management policy”), 
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The power of shareholder democracy to discipline 
management weakens as share ownership becomes more diffuse.  
As the shareholder’s proportionate ownership of the company 
shrinks, both the cost to the shareholder of allowing ineffective 
management and the voting power of the shareholder to prevent 
it diminish.  Various bodies of law reinforce shareholder 
democracy in broadly held corporations.  Proxy rules 
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) under the Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) 
restrict manipulation of shareholder voting by, for example, 
preventing the bundling of several proposals to force 
shareholders to approve the bad with the good.61  Securities 
exchanges and other markets qualifying as Self Regulating 
Organizations (“SROs”) under the Exchange Act impose 
restrictions on listed issuers.  These restrictions prop up 
shareholder democracy by, for example, requiring shareholder 
approval of additional equity compensation to management so as 
to prevent dilution of shareholder interests.  Tax law also plays a 
role in encouraging shareholder democracy.  For example, section 
280G of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Tax Code”) imposes an 
excise tax on certain severance payments to management in 
excess of a statutory threshold unless the payment is 
unanimously approved by shareholders.62   
 
rev’d on other grounds, 130 A.2d 338 (Del. 1957); Joseph Greenspon’s Sons Iron & 
Steel Co. v. Pecos Valley Gas Co., 156 A. 350, 351–52 (Del. Super. Ct. 1931) (holding 
that control of the company is vested in a company’s board of directors, which 
delegates its powers to officers); Cahall v. Lofland, 114 A. 224, 229 (Del. Ch. 1921) 
(holding that duties of directors “relate to supervision, direction and control, the 
details of the business being delegated to inferior officers, agents and employees”), 
aff’d, 118 A.1 (Del. 1922). For a proposal to expand policy decisions subject to 
shareholder democracy, responses to that proposal and its defense, see Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy and Shareholder 
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Response, 
Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution 
for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759 (2006); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, Reply, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784 (2006). 
61 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–ll (2006) (codifying the Exchange Act); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-4(a)(3), (b)(1) (2010); see also Koppel v. 4987 Corp., 167 F.3d 125, 134–35 
(2d Cir. 1999). 
62 While corporate law allows the attachment of voting rights to instruments 
other than common shares, in practice voting is restricted to shareholders. See 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 29, at 399 (“Almost all shares have one vote, and 
only shares possess votes.”). Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have explained 
this practice as a reflection of the shareholders’ incentives as residual claimants:  
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2. Disclosure 
Enfranchisement without more does not guarantee 
responsible governance.  For democratic feedback to steer 
management in the right direction, shareholders must be able to 
assess managerial performance.  Shareholders’ rights to be 
informed of firm performance serve as an essential complement 
to voting rights.  These rights have many sources.  State law 
generally provides “inspection rights,” which require corporations 
to make available firm financial information at shareholder 
request.63  A firm that has registered with the SEC either 
because it publicly issued securities or because its securities are 
held sufficiently broadly must comply with additional Exchange 
Act disclosure requirements, which include periodic reporting of 
the firm’s financial position, risks the firm faces in running its 
business, and performance relative to close competitors.64  In 
addition, the proxy statement of a registered firm must include 
details on directors’ and officers’ compensation, ostensibly to 
inform shareholders how much they are paying for the firm’s 
 
The firm should invest in new products, plants, etc., until the gains and 
costs are identical at the margin. Yet all of the actors, expect the 
shareholders, lack the appropriate incentives. Those with fixed claims on 
the income stream may receive only a tiny benefit (in increased security) 
from the undertaking of a new project. The shareholders receive most of the 
marginal gains and incur most of the marginal costs. They therefore have 
the right incentives to exercise discretion. 
Id. at 403. Whether shareholders truly are sole residual claimants will be addressed 
in Part II, below. 
63 The right of inspection has both common law and statutory sources. See DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2010) (granting inspection rights to shareholders of 
Delaware corporations); 5A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2239 (West rev. vol. 2004) 
(“The right of the shareholder at common law extends to all the books, papers, 
records, federal reports, and other data of the corporation respecting assets, 
liabilities, contracts, operations and practices, including correspondence between the 
controlling officers relating to the internal affairs of the corporation.”); id. 
(discussing statutory right, which in “a majority of . . . jurisdictions . . . extends to 
books and records of account, minutes and record of shareholders”). The business 
judgment rule, which is discussed subsequently, does not protect directors who fail 
to disclose information to the shareholders that is necessary to the latter’s “informed 
choice on a matter of fundamental corporate importance.” In re Anderson, Clayton 
S’holders’ Litig., 519 A.2d 669, 675 (Del. Ch. 1986). In some states, the certificate of 
incorporation may confer upon debt holders the same rights enjoyed by 
shareholders, including inspection rights. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 221 
(2010). 
64 See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 545–78 (6th ed. 2009). 
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performance.65  The rules of specific exchanges further expand 
shareholder access to information.  For example, Rule 15c2-11 of 
the Exchange Act requires broker-dealers to provide financial 
information on unlisted issuers of securities they mediate,66 thus 
ensuring that even a nonregistered firm’s financials will be 
available by a route other than state corporate law.67 
3. Fiduciary Duties 
In addition to the private deterrence imposed by shareholder 
democracy, directors and management are subject to civil 
liability as shareholders’ fiduciaries.68  There are two qualities to 
fear in a caretaker—evil and stupidity—either one of which may 
precipitate abusive decisions.  Fiduciary duties on their face offer 
protection against both evil and stupidity on the part of directors 
and management.  Though the formulation varies across states, 
management and directors are generally obligated to “perform 
[their] duties . . . in good faith and with that degree of care which 
an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under 
similar circumstances” and to do so in a manner reasonably 
believed to be in the best interest of the corporation.69  Evil 
violates the obligation to act in good faith and in a manner 
reasonably believed to be in the best interest of the corporation.  
 
65 See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 856 (2d Cir. 1968) (approving 
rescission of options granted to management where material facts were not 
disclosed). 
66 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11(a) (2010). 
67 Presumably if a purchaser acquires an instrument directly from the issuer 
without intermediation, the purchaser can request desired information from the 
issuer as part of the same transaction. 
68 Like debt covenants, fiduciary duties prevent mismanagement rather than 
ensure managerial excellence. To borrow an analogy from horse racing, both 
fiduciary duties and debt covenants form rails. They prevent the horses from 
wandering into the center of the track to graze on the lush grass—but they do not 
ensure that the horses give their all to the race. This similarity should not obscure 
the many distinctions between debt covenants and fiduciary duties. Debt covenants 
and fiduciary duties differ in origin, specificity, and obligated parties. The former are 
based in private law, take the form of rules, and obligate the firm vis-à-vis the 
creditor. The latter are based in public law, take the form of standards, and obligate 
directors and officers to the firm. 
69 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(a) (McKinney 2010) (specifying duties of 
directors); see 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1029 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2002) (introducing duty 
of care and distinguishing it from duty of loyalty); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 
(2002) (requiring each director to act “in good faith” and “in a manner the director 
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation”).  
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Stupidity would violate the statutory obligation of due care but 
for the court-created business judgment rule, which excuses 
decisions that yield poor results provided they are preceded with 
adequate procedure.70   
Several justifications have been offered for declawing the 
obligation of due care, among them the dangers of judging 
business decisions in hindsight and the ability of shareholders 
who are dissatisfied with the quality of management to leave the 
firm.71  The first explanation fails to explain courts’ 
unembarrassed assessment of business decisions on their 
economic merits in other contexts.  In the tax context, for 
example, the economic substance doctrine discussed in Part II.F 
asks whether a transaction poses “a reasonable possibility of 
[pretax] profit” when determining whether its form would be 
respected or whether the form would be disregarded and less 
favorable tax treatment accorded.72  As another example, in the 
antitrust context, courts ask whether a decision not to deal with 
a competitor was precipitated by anticompetitive motives or 
legitimate business purpose.73  A justification of the business 
judgment rule as judicious modesty fails to account for the 
selective practice of such modesty.  The second explanation is 
also, without more, unsatisfying.  It applies equally to the duty of 
good faith:  if a shareholder dislikes a self-dealing manager, the 
shareholder is as free to sell as if she dislikes a foolish one.  
Considering fiduciary duties as a complement to shareholder 
democracy, however, helps explain why courts have trimmed the 
duty of due care but not the duty of good faith.  A fiduciary who 
intentionally seeks to benefit himself at the expense of the firm is 
 
70 See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (limiting judicial analysis 
of due care to the procedure by which a decision was made rather than the substance 
of the decision). 
71 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1198 (1981) 
(discussing the business judgment rule as embodying a “policy of judicial restraint”); 
Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 473 (2004); 
Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks, FED. 
RES. BD., N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 93 (“Courts have long recognized the 
risks associated with judging directors’ decisions retrospectively . . . [and] responded 
by developing what is known as the Business Judgment Rule.”). 
72 See supra Part II.F. 
73 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608–09 
(1985) (requiring inquiry into whether decision not to cooperate with a rival was 
efficient when assessing whether such decision was anti-competitive).  
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likelier to manipulate the disclosure process upon which 
departure and deterrence through shareholder democracy are 
predicated.  A fool fiduciary is likelier to leave footprints 
revealing his stumbles, especially after being forced down a 
procedural path.74   
In a typical corporation and most of the time, fiduciary 
duties protect solely the shareholders.  There are, however, 
exceptions in which fiduciaries are duty-bound to multiple 
stakeholders simultaneously.  For example, officers and directors 
of a bank insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”) owe a duty of care to the bank, which the FDIC may 
enforce.75  Outside the banking industry, fiduciary duties expand 
to protect debtholders when a firm nears the zone of insolvency.76  
Moreover, shareholders themselves do not necessarily have the 
same interests or even rights, as some may be investing for the 
long term and others for the short term, or they may simply be 
holding distinct classes of shares with distinct voting or transfer 
rights. 
4. Market for Control 
While dispersed shareholders may be too light a rider to spur 
management to excellence, and fiduciary duties do nothing to 
restrict management from shabby decisions, management in a 
broadly held corporation may not be safe to remain in a state of 
perfectly unproductive repose.77  When management does less 
 
74 It is also worth noting that the deterrence effect of shareholder democracy 
diminishes during the fiduciary’s final term. Being fired becomes less of a threat to 
an officer who plans to retire anyway. The duty of good faith helps guard against 
otherwise rational self-dealing by officers in their last term, as it forces 
disgorgement of any gains achieved thereby. This second reason for the selective 
reduction of fiduciary duties is not as satisfying as the first because it does not 
consider that a fiduciary may allow his laziness to triumph in the final term as 
easily as his venality. 
75 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (2006); Atherton v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213, 
216 (1997); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 824–25 (N.J. 1981).   
76 While mismanagement in a firm with substantial residual hurts only the 
shareholders, as the residual evaporates, debtholders become exposed to additional 
losses. Thus while the occasions when debtholders formally enjoy fiduciary rights 
may be rare, positively, debtholders may enjoy such rights much of the time when 
they would matter. 
77 See Manne, supra note 13 (offering seminal formulation of the market for 
corporate control); Randall Morck et al., Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and 
Friendly Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 101 
(Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988). 
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than it can with a firm’s assets, it faces the threat that the share 
price becomes sufficiently depressed to make it worthwhile for a 
concentrated owner to emerge.  A third party with sufficient cash 
and certainty in the potential of the firm may buy a sufficient 
number of the shares from their dispersed holders to gain 
effective voting control over the board of directors, elect its own 
representatives to it, and have them install harder working 
management that better takes advantage of the firm’s capacity.78  
The purchase price offered to the dispersed shareholders may 
reflect a “control premium,” which shares the benefit of 
anticipated improvements in the firm’s performance with 
incumbent shareholders.  The more incumbent management 
mismanages the firm, the cheaper it becomes for a third party to 
offer a substantial premium to purchase control of the firm.79  
This corrective force is dubbed the “market for control” and rests 
on shareholders’ right to transfer their shares.  Without that 
right, the threat of a concentrated owner emerging to clean house 
would not be credible.80   
5. Market for Management 
Like the market for control, the market for management 
does not refer to a distinct shareholder right but rather to a force 
that derives from a legal right and encourages managerial 
excellence.  The predicate right to the market for control is the 
shareholder’s vote, especially as it applies to executive 
compensation.  As mentioned above, layers of state, federal, 
agency, and SRO law enhance shareholder power as voters on 
issues of executive compensation.81  Well-designed executive 
compensation packages align the interests of management with 
the interests of shareholders.  For instance, by granting officers 
 
78 See Manne, supra note 13, at 112–14. 
79 The extent to which the market for control disciplines management has been 
the subject of academic debate. See, e.g., F. M. Scherer, Corporate Takeovers: The 
Efficiency Argument, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 1, 69, 80 (1988) (“In theory, tender offer 
takeovers provide a significant corrective against managerial departures from profit 
maximization. Careful scrutiny of the available evidence[, however,] leads to a more 
skeptical assessment.”). 
80 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(d) (2010) (enumerating per se reasonable 
purposes for restrictions on the transfer of securities); ANGELA SCHNEEMAN, THE 
LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 286, 288–91 (3d ed. 
2002) (discussing permissible restrictions on the alienability of stock).   
81 See supra Part I.B.1. 
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stock in the corporation, the shareholders can ensure that 
management will benefit when they do.82 
Where the market for control takes place between 
shareholders, the market for management is between candidate-
officers.  The better a candidate believes she would be at the job, 
the more she expects to gain from stock based compensation.  
Thus, were the firm to run an auction for the executive office 
holding the amount of equity compensation constant and 
allowing candidates to submit bids reporting the minimum cash 
compensation they would be willing to work for, the best 
candidate83 would take the lowest amount of cash compensation.  
To the extent that contests among candidates for executive 
positions follow this procedure, not only is the quality of the 
candidates maximized, but the amount of cash expended by the 
firm is minimized.  This is the ex ante benefit of the market for 
management.  The firm continues to benefit from the market ex 
post as the executive’s well-being is tied to that of shareholders 
through the equity component of her compensation. 
 
82 Such grants are not without downsides. First, they dilute the nonofficer 
shareholders, who now must share the residual with the officers. When equity 
grants substitute for cash compensation, the dilution is offset by the savings the firm 
realizes on executives’ salaries. Second, awarding an executive a large block of stock 
may discourage the executive from bold but efficient strategies because the block 
may represent a very large portion of the executive’s net wealth. To offset this 
deterrent to productive risk taking, firms may award executives out of the money 
options, which only acquire value when the firm surprises investors’ expectations. 
Finally, equity compensation may increase incentives for management to engage in 
earnings management. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where 
We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How To Fix Them 47 
(European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 44, 2004), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305; see also Daniel B. Bergstresser & 
Thomas Philippon, CEO Incentives and Earnings Management: Evidence from the 
1990s, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 511, 521–24 (2006) (showing evidence that earnings 
management increases with equity compensation). 
83 This assumes that candidates could judge their own quality and have equal 
opportunity costs. If they cannot judge their quality, the hired officer may suffer 
from the winner’s curse, and the company may suffer from an arrogant fool. See J. B. 
Heaton, Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGMT. 33, 33–35 
(2002) (summarizing literature on optimism and exploring its implications for 
managerial decisionmaking). If candidates do not share the same alternatives, then 
a lower cash bid may be motivated by the absence of anything better rather than 
from an ability to more effectively exploit firm resources. 
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II. THE TAX AUTHORITY AS EQUITY HOLDER 
The economic interest the tax authority has in a firm is 
similar but not identical to that of the shareholder.84  To 
understand the extent of overlap between shareholders’ and the 
tax authority’s interests, it bears taking a look at the role and 
principles of tax accounting.  Whereas accounting serves merely 
to inform shareholders of the firm’s financial position, accounting 
wholly determines how much the tax authority receives.  A firm’s 
tax liability is calculated by applying a progressive schedule of 
rates to its positive taxable income and then subtracting certain 
credits.85  Taxable income is arrived at by reducing the firm’s 
gross income by various expenses, such as interest payments to 
debtholders.86  At this level of generality, taxable income 
represents a quantity indistinct from net income under GAAP.   
Tax and GAAP measures of gross income and expenses, 
however, do differ.87  Whereas GAAP seek to assess a firm’s 
financial position, tax accounting also serves regulatory goals, 
which occasionally conflict with accurate reporting of income.88  
For example, interest payments from municipal bonds are not 
included in taxable income.  This is not an oversight by tax 
accountants.  Rather, the omission is designed to allow the 
federal government to subsidize local governments without 
having to go through the additional steps of raising tax revenues 
at the federal level and then redistributing them to the local 
level.89  As an example of another difference, revenues and 
expenses are generally recognized by tax accounting closer to the 
time at which they resolve into cash inflows and outflows.  This 
 
84 See Schlunk, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
85 See STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION 14–23 
(7th ed. 2008) (describing the process of calculating a corporation’s tax liability, 
including any under the alternative minimum tax). 
86 Id. at 132–34 (explaining the distinct tax treatment of equity and debt and 
discussing some of the factors used to determine whether an instrument is equity or 
debt). 
87 See David I. Walker, Financial Accounting and Corporate Behavior, 64 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 927, 971–1008 (2007) (discussing implications of conforming tax to 
GAAP accounting); see also Robert Willens, Defining and Dealing with a Deferred 
Tax Asset, 27 TAX MGMT. WEEKLY REP. 1224 (2008).   
88 See Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm’r, 439 U.S. 522, 542 (1979) (discussing 
difference in purpose of tax and GAAP accounting). 
89 See Kevin M. Yamamoto, A Proposal for the Elimination of the Exclusion for 
State Bond Interest, 50 FLA. L. REV. 145, 150–52 (1998) (criticizing the subsidy as 
inefficient and inequitable and proposing an alternative means for subsidizing state 
spending on public goods). 
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difference in timing avoids potential liquidity costs that could be 
imposed on firms if they had to service tax liability based on 
gains in the value of assets difficult to convert to cash.90  The 
difference in timing also extends the lag between accounting and 
reality.91  While GAAP itself does not perfectly assess a firm’s net 
income, these departures from GAAP further distort its 
measure.92 
The differences in measurement between tax accounting and 
whatever measure shareholders use to gauge their own well-
being qua shareholders is the practical justification for this 
Article because it is these differences that necessitate granting 
the tax authority its own control rights.93  To the extent that 
maximizing the residual available to common shareholders also 
maximizes taxable income, assertive shareholders incidentally 
safeguard the tax authority’s interest.94 
 
90 See Wolfgang Schön, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Odd Couple: A 
Common Future for Financial and Tax Accounting?, 58 TAX L. REV. 111, 133–39 
(2005) (discussing liquidity impact of tax accounting as a motivation for the 
disparities between tax and GAAP accounting). 
91 See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 437 (4th Cir. 
2006) (discussing a transaction that accelerated the recognition of contingent 
liabilities despite the general “prohibition against claiming a deduction in a given 
tax year for an estimate of liabilities that have not become fixed by the end of that 
year”). 
92 Acknowledging that these differences should not obscure pervasive 
similarities between GAAP and tax accounting, just as failures of GAAP to provide 
omniscient accounts of firms do not rebut its utility. 
93 Michelle Hanlon and Terry Shevlin defend the nonconformity of tax and 
GAAP accounting based on similar observations. See Michelle Hanlon & Terry 
Shevlin, Book-Tax Conformity for Corporate Income: An Introduction to the Issues, in 
19 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 101, 103–04 (James Poterba ed., 2005). If a single 
measure is adopted for calculating book and tax income, then either the regulatory 
goals of the tax system will be compromised or the informational content of financial 
statements will be limited to that provided by tax accounting. Hanlon and Shevlin 
review evidence of the relative informational paucity of tax accounting, arguing that 
book tax conformity will either blunt the regulatory force of the Tax Code or blind 
investors. Id. at 127 nn.1, 5, 7. 
94 Shareholders are further incented to pursue the interests of the tax authority 
through the tax authority’s priority in bankruptcy. While the tax authority receives 
only a percentage of net income while the firm is solvent, a bankrupt firm must pay 
the tax authority in full before a shareholder receives a penny. 
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (2006) (requiring that unsecured creditors are paid in full 
before junior creditors receive distributions pursuant to a chapter 11 plan); id. 
§ 507(a) (granting, second, priority unsecured status—or administrative priority—to 
tax liability incurred post petition and, eighth priority unsecured status to tax 
liability incurred in the three years ending with the date of petition); see in re 
Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 116 F.3d 1391, 1396 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that tax 
liability for income earned post-petition are afforded administrative priority, 
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Assertive shareholders pose a threat to the tax authority’s 
interests when an activity that maximizes pretax income does 
not maximize after-tax income.95  To understand why, it is 
sufficient to note that tax operates in reverse of tort.  Whereas 
tort forces internalization of negative externalities, tax forces the 
externalization of positive internalities.  Within a tax system, 
those engaging in productive economic activity internalize only a 
portion—after-tax income—of the market value of their output—
pretax income.  The balance is transferred to the state for the 
public wealth.  When externalities are not internalized, social 
welfare may be lost as private actors maximize private gain.  
Just as, absent nuisance law, a factory may pollute though its 
profits do not exceed the environmental costs, absent control 
rights for the tax authority, shareholders may sacrifice tax 
receipts for increases in their after-tax income.   
The choice of behaviors that increase after-tax income at the 
expense of pretax income is not necessarily troubling.96  Tax 
accounting has regulatory goals besides measuring income, and 
many of these include encouraging (or discouraging) behaviors 
favored (or disfavored) by Congress, which again are assumed to 
be those with relatively higher positive (or negative) 
externalities.  Examples include the favorable treatment of 
income from investment and patent production,97 mortgage and 
tuition interest deductions,98 and unfavorable treatment of 
income and loss—-ordinary income, capital loss—on disposition 
of land that was once wetland.99  Like other statutes, however, 
the Tax Code is drafted by people who cannot predict all 
 
whereas tax on income earned prepetition and taxes for the three taxable years 
preceding petition are afforded seventh—now eighth—priority).  
95 See Schlunk, supra note 4, at 7.   
96 See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing 
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. 
L. REV. 705, 711–13 (1970) (criticizing use of Tax Code to implement social programs 
as nontransparent).   
97 See David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interest in Private Equity, 94 
VA. L. REV. 715, 743–44 n.70 (2008). 
98 See JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 500–03 (15th ed. 2009) (discussing deductibility of qualified residence 
interest, interest from home equity indebtedness, and interest on qualified 
educational loans as well as general nondeductibility of personal expenses). 
99 I.R.C. § 1257(a)–(b) (2006) (providing that gain from the disposition of such 
land will be treated as ordinary gain and thus subject to higher tax rates, while loss 
from the disposition of such land will be treated as capital loss and thus offsets 
income that would be taxed at lower tax rates).   
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instances in which it will be applied.  As a result, favorable rates 
may be inadvertently granted.100  If a corporation responds to a 
change in a tax rate, it does so to maximize its private income.  If 
before an increase in an effective tax rate, the corporation 
pursued Project A and afterwards it chose to pursue Project B, 
that indicates that the tax rate reduced the relative private 
income from Project A.  From a normative perspective, if the 
increase in positive externality from the firm’s pursuit of Project 
B is not worth the decrease in private income, then the tax rate is 
socially inefficient.101  From an engineering perspective—a 
perspective that seeks to implement congressional will whatever 
it may be—a response to the differential tax rate is only 
undesirable if it was unintended by Congress.  Either view 
requires the control rights granted to the tax authority to be 
sufficiently flexible to distinguish between exploitative and 
desirable responses to tax incentives.  Facially pro-tax authority 
designs that maximize pretax income may be inadvisable if they 
sufficiently reduce intended incentives.102  On the other hand, 
designs that allow private interest holders to structure the firm’s 
affairs exclusively to reduce tax liability will result in social costs 
as firms sacrifice pretax for after-tax income.103 
Acknowledging this inherent tension, the rest of this Part 
compares control rights typically enjoyed by common 
shareholders with those protecting the tax authority.  The 
contrast hopes to be productive by bringing alternative designs 
 
100 For example, a poorly drafted tax credit meant to incent a shift from gasoline 
to alternative fuels allows companies whose production process already relies on 
alternative fuels to qualify for the credit by adding fossil fuels. See Bob Ivry & 
Christopher Donville, Black Liquor Tax Boondoggle May Net Billions for 
Papermakers, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 17, 2009), www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=newsarchive&sid=abDjfGgdumh4.  
101 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF 
TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 53 (Comm. Print 2008) (explaining the efficiency 
concept). 
102 See David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 
224 (2002) (“[I]f Congress intends to subsidize or penalize a particular activity 
through the tax system, changes in behavior because of the tax may be desirable.”). 
103 See id. (“Anytime anyone alters his behavior because of taxes we have the 
same problem—the changed behavior imposes costs on others that the person does 
not take into account.”). The costs to the tax authority of administering the 
safeguard and to the taxpayer of complying with it should be included when 
evaluating the desirability of adding the safeguard. See Edgar K. Browning, The 
Marginal Cost of Public Funds, 84 J. POL. ECON. 283, 294–95 (1976) (explaining why 
the costs of administering and complying with a tax have to be included in the 
assessment of its desirability).   
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 851 (2010) 
2010] TAX AUTHORITY 877 
into relief.  This Part starts by observing that the tax authority 
does not participate in shareholder democracy and is not 
protected by the markets for control or management.  It provides 
counterfactual designs of the tax authority’s control rights that 
would allow it to vote and benefit from the markets for control 
and management.  It then discusses why extending these 
protections to the tax authority may be inadvisable.  Next, it 
explains how the primary substitute for these absent control 
rights that is granted to the tax authority—the mandatory 
dividend—balances the tax authority’s competing interests as 
revenue raiser and regulator.  This Part concludes with a 
comparison of the disclosure rights and judicial doctrines 
protecting shareholders and the tax authority.  When proposing 
alternative designs, the Article seeks to understand whether 
revenue raising and regulatory goals can be preserved while 
making the tax system more efficient through reducing the 
exploitation of unintended subsidies.104 
A. Shareholder Democracy 
A basic difference between shareholders and the tax 
authority is that only the former participate in firm governance.  
This need not be the case.105  Before considering alternatives, a 
basic constraint on the efficacy of allowing the tax authority 
board representation should be considered.  Representative 
democracy has a winner take all property that leaves government 
exclusively to the representatives of the majority.  Where two 
well-defined factions participate in an election, the majority will 
win and need not make concessions to the minority.  On first 
pass, injection of the tax authority into corporate governance will 
 
104 Tax policy has goals besides efficiency—including equity. Concerns of equity 
will be ignored by this Article, in part because it concerns the treatment of 
corporations rather than people. 
105 Like any change contemplated in this Article, this one may be impractical 
politically due to, for example, cultural antipathy to government participation in the 
affairs of corporations. Political barriers to revising the protections currently 
afforded to the tax authority will not be discussed. Expansions of control rights may 
also be objected to as subversions of the constitutional division of power between 
state and federal government, which allocates regulation of corporations to states. 
But see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of 
Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1585 n.29 (2005) (“There is no plausible 
constitutional argument that Congress would not have the power, under the 
Commerce Clause, to preempt state corporate law with a national corporate law.”). 
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either accomplish nothing or disenfranchise shareholders.106  If 
shareholders are allowed a majority of board seats, the directors 
appointed by the tax authority act as little more than 
observers.107  If, on the other hand, the tax authority is allowed to 
control a majority of the board, shareholders are denied their 
primary safeguard, thus discouraging investment.  But grace and 
devils both dwell in implementation details.  For example, rather 
than voting in the general election for directors, the tax authority 
could be allowed to appoint a representative to the board with 
veto power over any resolution that sought to exploit an 
unintended rate differential.  Generally, this tax director would 
not take part in the actions of a board.  To the extent, however, 
that a board action exploited what was, in the tax director’s 
judgment, an unintentional rate differential, she would be able to 
veto such action or condition its validity on consent to the less 
favorable treatment.108 
 
106 This is a grossly oversimplified model of board behavior. For more nuanced 
treatment, see generally JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR 
POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS (1989); Gerald F. 
Davis & Henrich R. Greve, Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the 
1980s, 103 AM. J. SOC. 1 (1997); Mark S. Mizruchi, Who Controls Whom? An 
Examination of the Relation Between Management and Boards of Directors in Large 
American Corporations, 8 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 426 (1983). 
107 Granting the tax authority observers on boards may result in certain 
benefits. To the extent tax observers did not push forthright deliberation outside the 
boardroom, they could inform subsequent assessments of board actions. As Part II.F 
discusses in more detail, anti-avoidance doctrines may disqualify taxpayers from 
favorable tax treatment where their actions were motivated by tax minimization. 
The inquiry into motive, however, suffers from limited information and hindsight 
bias. A competent attorney can sterilize the minutes and agreements that document 
a business decision to ensure they do not evidence improper motives. Without 
dependable memorialization of the decisionmaking process, a court may judge the 
motives for a decision by its results. A business decision that failed to pan out but 
generated tax savings may be attacked as impermissible tax avoidance. Tax 
observers can provide courts with a disinterested first hand account of the 
deliberative process behind business decisions, increasing accuracy and potentially 
enabling broader application of anti-avoidance doctrines. 
108 As an optional complement to the veto power, the representative’s accession 
to board actions could insulate their results from ex post challenges by the IRS. The 
desirability of this alternative could be assessed based on the usual tradeoffs 
between judges and umpires. Judicial adjudication, being based on the categories 
established by sources of law including precedent, has the benefits of consistency 
and the costs of over and underinclusiveness. The accumulation of precedent tends 
to produce less uncertainty generally, but in any one case, subjects the regulated 
party to uncertainty for a longer period of time as disposition of the party’s rights 
will generally follow its business decision and may even last beyond the original 
determination by the agency, district court or even court of appeals as judicial 
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Extending representation in corporate governance to the tax 
authority would have to overcome a significant practical hurdle.  
There are over 1.2 million corporations in the United States.109  
Finding one qualified tax director for each of them may demand 
more qualified appointees than are plausibly available, even if 
appointees serve on multiple boards.110  Nor would tax directors 
be able to substitute for regular directors provided that their 
decisionmaking role was limited to situations where the board’s 
act would exploit an unintended rate differential.111  That said, 
these practical concerns could be addressed by deploying the 
right selectively.  For example, a tax director could be appointed 
to the board of each of the Fortune 500 companies.  In addition  
 
 
 
 
review takes its course. In our present system—firms may reference the law the 
Treasury or judges will apply when auditing or adjudicating a challenge to the audit 
when designing business strategy. On the other hand, the present system exposes 
firms to risk of audit and adverse judicial determination well after a board adopts a 
business strategy. See, e.g., Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock 
Life Ins. Co., 588 F. Supp. 2d 919, 928 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (rejecting the trial court’s 
conclusion that a contract was unenforceable because it accomplished tax 
avoidance), aff’d on other grounds, 582 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2009). An umpire based 
system lacks the consistency and ex ante predictability of accumulating predent but 
compensates with finality, as it insulates business decisions approved by tax 
directors from further scrutiny. An umpire based system also has the benefit that 
the authority evaluating a decision is located in the same place and time as the 
decision makers, so that the legal assessment is made with no more and (assuming 
communications are not made informally) no less information than that available to 
those who had to make the decision.   
109 See UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX 
ADMINISTRATION: COMPARISON OF THE REPORTED TAX LIABILITIES OF FOREIGN- AND 
U.S.-CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS, 1998–2005 23, 28 (2008) (reporting survey of 
corporate tax liability between 1998 and 2005, including the number of U.S. 
corporate filers). 
110 Moving beyond corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies, and 
other businesses may also engage in exploitation of unintended rate differentials. If 
the tax authority’s control rights were to be implemented through participation as a 
partner, member, or analog, the demand for eligible directors would be even greater. 
111 Potentially, the involvement of tax directors could decrease the Treasury’s 
demand for personnel to detect tax evasion and respond to effective tax avoidance. 
Moreover, their involvement could decrease the burden on courts that review 
transactions after challenge by the IRS. A tax director’s consent or objection to board 
action could be granted presumptive validity. Acknowledging these potential 
savings, it remains difficult to imagine how a system of tax directors could be 
implemented that would ultimately result in savings of administrative resources—
though such a system may improve other features of the tax regime. 
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and/or as an alternative, a thousand corporate taxpayers could be 
selected randomly and a tax director installed on each of their 
boards.112 
Moving beyond more tangible resource constraints, it may be 
questioned whether an act that expressly installed government 
representatives in corporate governance would expose firm 
decisions to political influence to net social detriment.  As 
discussed further below, safeguards of the tax authority’s 
interest as currently implemented are designed to be passive.  
Differential tax rates align the self-interest of residual 
claimholders with policy goals, effectively subsidizing the cost of 
equity capital for favored projects.  Rather than installing 
government appointees to choose firm policy, the present regime 
acts indirectly by supplying the parameters for decisions left to 
privately appointed directors and officers.  The current regime, 
however, is not wholly passive, as the deterrents to tax evasion 
and avoidance ultimately rely on the involvement of courts.  
Where firms misreport tax attributes or exploit unintended rate 
differentials, government representatives do subsequently 
disqualify them from the favorable tax rates.113  A system in 
which government representatives are exposed to the 
deliberations preceding board action and invalidate such actions 
at the time they are taken—rather than rely on a mix of 
imperfect evidence and hindsight to invalidate actions ex post—
may intrude less and more accurately in private enterprise than 
the present system.114  Whether the tax director concept is 
adopted or the status quo is maintained, officials selected 
through the political process effect the validity and tax treatment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 All credit for suggesting the use of random sampling to expand the tax 
director program is owed to David Weisbach, who suggested it. All discredit is due 
entirely to the author of this Article. 
113 See, e.g., Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 
172 (D. Conn. 2004). 
114 See supra note 108.  
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of board actions.115  The substantive difference between a tax 
director and a judge is not apparent and may be narrowed 
through design.116 
B. Market for Control 
The market for control does not distinctly benefit the tax 
authority.  In fact, its present incarnation allocates assets to 
those who maximize their after-tax returns, thus preferring 
owners best able to minimize the tax authority’s share.117  
The market for control could be adapted to serve the revenue 
raising goals of the tax authority, but the current inalienability 
of tax receivables prevents such adaptation.  Unlike a 
shareholder, the Treasury cannot sell its interest in a firm.  
Thus, parties who are better able to maximize the value of the 
tax receivables are prevented from acquiring them.  If the 
Treasury could sell its rights in firms’ tax receipts to parties who 
are better able to increase the value of those rights, co-ownership 
of the rights to such receipts and equity would reduce the 
externality and the resulting social costs imposed by tax.118   
If shareholders had rights to a firm’s tax liability in 
proportion to their ownership of the firm’s equity, they would 
steer firms to maximize pretax income.  Every dollar of 
additional pretax income would benefit such shareholders 
equally, whether it were distributed to them on account of their 
shares or their rights to tax receipts.  Provided proportionate 
ownership of shares and tax receipts could be achieved, no 
shareholder would benefit from expenses incurred to reduce tax 
liability.  Proportionate ownership could theoretically evolve from 
simply offering the receivables to the market.  If the government 
were to auction its tax receivables to the highest bidder, 
 
115 In the past, the SEC has signed consent decrees with corporations that 
violated federal securities laws, requiring the election of independent directors. See 
Chris R. Ottenweller, Comment, Court-Appointed Directors: Ancillary Relief in 
Federal Securities Law Enforcement Actions, 64 GEO. L.J. 737, 738 (1976). 
116 For example, the political independence of judges may partly be a function of 
life tenure. Tax directors could similarly be given life tenure, albeit the companies 
they are directors of may have to change over their lifetimes. 
117 See ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 607–21 (2008) (explaining why share 
price reflects after-tax cash flows). 
118 See Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One 
More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 561 (1993) (“[If] a single owner 
test yields a unique result, then [that result] should be followed by the legal 
system.”). 
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assuming perfect information and no liquidity constraints, the 
receivables would be purchased by the entity able to turn the 
highest pretax profit.119  In the absence of liquidity constraints, a 
single owner of both the common shares and tax receivables, who 
would be positioned to collect the full pretax returns from the 
business, would determine the highest bid.  Of course, in the real 
world, liquidity would constrain potential bidders from collecting 
all of the shares and tax receivables of a firm.  Moreover, 
information is scarce, so there may be few, if any, bidders able to 
valuate the pretax potential of a firm—though it is not clear that 
the tools to make those valuations are any different from the 
tools in use now to valuate firms’ after-tax earnings. 
For firms not yet incorporated, an easier alternative exists, 
which would not impose the administrative costs of organizing 
auctions on the government and be more accommodating to 
investors’ liquidity constraints.  Corporations could be taxed on 
their proceeds from their primary offerings of equity and then 
excused from paying corporate taxes.120  The expected value of 
the excused taxes would be impounded in the purchase price as 
would the social welfare lost to tax avoidance.121  By taxing the 
purchase price, the tax authority would be able to share in 
income undistorted by tax avoidance.122 
An objection to implementing a market for receivables is that 
it negates the regulatory power of the Tax Code.  As discussed 
 
119 Taxation on projected profits, even if the projection has the benefit of all 
available information, will result in overtaxing investors when the firm 
underperforms and undertaxing investors when the firm succeeds. See Alan J. 
Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 167, 167 (1991). 
120 The present regime does not tax corporations on proceeds from offerings. See 
25 U.S.C. § 1032 (2006).  
121 This assumes that share price reflects discounted after-tax dividends. See 
BODIE ET AL., supra note 117. The projected corporate tax liability would be 
impounded in the purchase price because the firm’s after-tax retained earnings 
would no longer be reduced by taxes on its income. See MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., 
TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH 130–37 (2009) (explaining 
that the market price of tax favored productive assets increases until prospective 
investors are indifferent between them and their non-favored alternative). In the 
absence of corporate taxes, corporations would face no incentive to structure their 
activities to reduce such taxes. Instead, corporations would pursue projects that 
maximized risk adjusted returns, allowing investors to internalize the deadweight 
loss of tax avoidance of the status quo. 
122 At the corporate level, this would effectively replace the income tax with a 
consumption tax. For a rigorous comparison of income to consumption taxation, see 
Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption 
Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006). 
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above, maneuvers that maximize after-tax income at the expense 
of pretax income are not necessarily contrary to legislative 
intent.  Preferential tax rates induce shifts to congressionally 
favored forms of enterprise.123  Once the incentive to seek out 
preferential rates is removed, the power of the tax system to 
motivate legislatively preferred behavior is extinguished.  That 
said, to the extent a tax regime overemphasizes the regulatory 
goals, introducing a partial market for tax receivables—for 
example, at a five percent rate on the proceeds—could be 
implemented to rebalance it.  Some countries have done exactly 
this, imposing what is effectively a sales tax on proceeds from 
equity offerings.124  
If the present system for delivering regulatory subsidies 
through the Tax Code was revised to separate them into credits, 
that system could then be adapted to decrease the efficiency loss 
to unintended subsidies.125  Scholars and regulators have 
distinguished between favorable treatment justified by 
administrative concerns and favorable treatment that is 
predominantly regulatory.126  If the administrative concerns were 
reflected in the calculation of taxable income, while regulatory 
goals were reflected solely in tax credits that were then 
subtracted from the product of the applicable rates and the 
taxable income calculated in the first stage, then privatization of 
tax liability owed based solely on taxable income would reduce 
the deadweight loss from adjustments to administrative 
subsidies.  Firms would nevertheless remain subject to the 
regulatory incentives posed by the tax credits, as those would not 
be auctioned off. 
 
123 Like other responses to regulation, these may be normatively desirable if the 
aggregate of pre-regulation private income and positive externalities is less than the 
aggregate of post-regulation private income and positive externalities. 
124 See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, CORPORATE TAXES, WORLDWIDE 
SUMMARIES: 2004–2005, at 36 (2004) (Austria imposes a 1% tax on initial 
contributions of capital); id. at 295 (Greece imposes a 0.3% tax on sales of shares 
listed on the Athens Stock Exchange); id. at 483 (Luxembourg imposes a 1% tax on 
capital contributions); id. at 573 (the Netherlands impose a 0.55% tax on capital 
contributions). 
125 See, e.g., STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO 
IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 42 (Comm. Print 2005) 
(proposing unification of tax subsidies for education through a credit). 
126 See, e.g., STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., A 
RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 9–11 (Comm. Print 2008) 
(summarizing difference between tax subsidies and tax-induced structural 
distortions). 
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C. Market for Management 
Like the market for control, the market for management as 
presently instituted does not protect the tax authority’s interest 
where it departs from that of shareholders.127  As explained 
above, the market for management provides three distinct 
benefits to shareholders.128  First, it minimizes executive’s cash 
compensation.  Second, it selects for the most self-confident, and 
some argue competent, management.129  Third, and most 
importantly, it makes managers and directors themselves equity-
holders—thus aligning their interest with those of their 
 
127 A classic example where the market for management failed to the benefit of 
the U.S. Treasury is the well known case of Kamin v. American Express Co., 86 Misc. 
2d 809, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1976). Kamin, the plaintiff, had filed a 
derivative suit against the directors of American Express alleging that the directors 
had breached their fiduciary duties by approving a distribution of depreciated shares 
instead of selling the shares to realize the loss and thus decrease taxes at the 
corporate level. Id. at 811–12, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 810. The pleadings alleged that the 
choice to distribute was motivated by the parameters of managerial compensation 
contracts, which were tied to the earnings of American Express—earnings that 
would have been reduced had the shares been sold rather than distributed. Id. at 
814, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 811. Because the compensation of a majority of the directors 
who approved the transaction was not dependent on whether the shares were sold or 
distributed, the court dismissed the suit. Id., 383 N.Y.S.2d at 811–12. The court’s 
analysis did not consider the predicate question of whether one set of residual 
claimants should be able to sue directors for failing to privilege them over another 
set of residual claimants. While Kamin is no more than a well-known anecdote, 
recent empirical research confirms a complex relationship between corporate 
governance and tax avoidance. See Shuping Chen et al., Are Family Firms More Tax 
Aggressive Than Non-Family Firms?, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 41, 41 (2010) (providing 
evidence that family firms engage in less tax management than broadly held firms 
and arguing that the difference is owed to the complementarity between tax 
avoidance and expropriation from outside shareholders); Mihir A. Desai & 
Dhammika Dharmapala, Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value, 91 REV. ECON. 
STAT. 537, 537–38 (2009) (showing that the quality of corporate governance 
positively affects how much shareholders’ value increases in after-tax income due to 
tax avoidance); Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Corporate Tax Avoidance 
and High-Powered Incentives, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 145, 146 (2006) [hereinafter How-
Powered Incentives] (finding that increases in incentive compensation tend to reduce 
the level of tax sheltering); Mihir A. Desai et al., Theft and Taxes, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 
591, 592 (2007); Omrane Guedhami & Jeffrey Pittman, The Importance of IRS 
Monitoring to Debt Pricing in Private Firms, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 38, 38 (2008) (arguing 
that expropriation from the tax authority is complementary to expropriation from 
debtholders based on evidence that IRS audits decrease yields on debt issued by 
private firms); see also Keith J. Crocker & Joel Slemrod, Corporate Tax Evasion with 
Agency Costs, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1593, 1594–96 (2005) (proposing a model of firms’ tax 
avoidance decision that accounts for the principal-agent relationship between the 
firm and those who make the decision). 
128 See Part I.B.5. 
129 But see Heaton, supra note 83. 
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principals.  The first of these benefits does not fully redound to 
the tax authority’s benefit.  In calculating taxable income, the 
Tax Code deliberately ignores certain expenditures on executive 
compensation.130  For example, under section 162(m), deductions 
for compensation to the chief executive officer and the next four 
highest paid employees of public companies are limited to $1 
million.131  As another example, under section 280G, certain 
severance payments deemed “golden parachutes” are 
nondeductible to public firms.132  The second of these benefits 
accrues to the tax authority only to the extent that pretax income 
correlates with after-tax income.  The third benefit, like the 
market for control, may actually run counter to the interests of 
the tax authority as it incents management to maximize after-tax 
income at the expense of tax receipts. 
Legal revisions could expand the market for management to 
further the tax authority’s interest.  For example, executives in 
every company could be granted a percentage of the firm’s tax 
receipts representing a fraction of their equity interest.  If the 
fraction were one, any motivation to avoid taxes arising from 
their equity stakes would be neutralized by their interest in the 
tax receipts.  Potentially, a fraction greater than one would be 
required to countervail the pressure exerted by other 
shareholders, who would continue to prefer any decrease in 
pretax income to achieve an increase in after-tax income.133  
 
130 See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive 
Compensation, 14 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 1, 4–7 (2000). 
131 I.R.C. § 162(m) (West 2011); see also Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive 
Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 884–86 (2007) 
(explaining the history and operation of § 162(m)). 
132 I.R.C. § 280G (2006 & Supp. II). 
133 Compensation contracts may condition pay on accounting metrics—such as 
“revenue,” “revenue growth,” “pretax profits,” “EBIT/EBITDA,” “return on assets,” 
“return on operating income,” “return on capital,” and “cash flow”—and 
nonaccounting metrics—such as “quality assurance,” “new business,” “market 
share,” and “customer satisfaction”—that are independent of a firm’s tax expense. 
See LANCE A. BERGER & DOROTHY R. BERGER, THE COMPENSATION HANDBOOK: A 
STATE-OF-THE-ART GUIDE TO COMPENSATION STRATEGY AND DESIGN 334–35 (5th ed. 
2008) (discussing use of accounting metrics in formula-value share plans that 
reward lower tier management with equity based on “the organization’s earnings, 
revenues, cash flow, or other combination of measures that the market might be 
expected to consider in assigning value to the company or division”); KEN BERTSCH 
ET AL., U.S. EXECUTIVE PAY STRUCTURE AND METRICS 6–7 (2006) (providing an 
overview of accounting and nonaccounting based metrics); JAMES F. REDA & ASSOC., 
LLC, STUDY OF PERFORMANCE METRICS AMONG S&P 500 LARGE-CAP STOCK 
COMPANIES 12 (2009) (showing that metrics unrelated to tax liability appear in 
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A problem with granting management an interest in tax 
receipts is the same as the problem with granting all 
shareholders an interest in tax receipts.  Specifically, as those 
directing the firm grow indifferent between uses of pretax 
income, the power of tax to incent legislatively desired behavior 
decreases.  In fact, if management is granted too great an 
interest in tax receipts, disfavorable tax rates intended to deter 
exploitative behavior may result in a reverse effect, encouraging 
management to engage in conduct subject to high rates.  That 
said, in a second best world where revenue is excessively 
compromised to regulatory goals, the implementation of such 
interests might result in an improvement.  Moreover, assuming 
sufficiently high agency costs, this method may be preferable to 
the sale of tax receivables as it would more efficiently target the 
relevant decisionmakers. 
As with the market for control, an alternative design could 
preserve the regulatory power of the Tax Code and further its 
revenue goals.  If the Tax Code was redesigned so that its 
regulatory goals were achieved exclusively through tax credits, 
the market for management could be used to calibrate the 
balance towards either regulation or revenues.134  In such a 
world, management compensation could be based on a 
combination of: (1) a fraction of tax credits earned by the firm, 
and (2) a fraction of the firm’s taxable income, measured without 
application of tax credits.  To stress either the regulatory or the 
revenue raising objectives, the former or latter fractions would be 
increased, respectively.  To ensure that shareholders could not 
unwind the incentives to pursue objectives other than after-tax 
earnings, limitations—such as nondeductibility to the firm and 
high tax rates applicable to the executive—could be imposed on 
performance compensation.  Such an approach, however, would 
 
thirty and one hundred percent of contracts for S&P 500 companies); Christopher D. 
Ittner et al., The Choice of Performance Measures in Annual Bonus Contracts, 72 
ACCT. REV. 231, 240 (1997) (observing that 12.8% of firms in a 312 firm sample 
selected based on availability of proxy statements via Lexis/Nexis based short term 
compensation on cash flow metrics). Directly rewarding management for increasing 
the firm’s tax liability, however, may go beyond these accepted modes of 
compensation and implicate the duty of loyalty. If that were the case, changes in the 
tax regime to implement a market for management may have to be accompanied 
with provisions preempting state law liability for breach of the duty of loyalty.  
134 See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology of 
Redistribution, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1763–64 (2005) (documenting behavioral 
preferences as between deductions and credits).  
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depend on being able to parse regulatory goals into credits.  This 
problem is far from trivial but is simpler than the problem of 
actually jointly optimizing regulatory and revenue raising 
goals.135   
D. Periodic Dividends 
Shareholders of U.S. corporations do not have a right to 
receive a portion of a firm’s retained earnings via a dividend at 
any time certain.136  Instead, they receive distributions only when 
directors choose to declare them.  Directors are under no 
obligation to declare dividends but are incented to declare them 
through shareholder democracy and the market for management.  
Presumably, if directors indefinitely delayed declaring dividends, 
shareholders could vote to terminate them.  Additionally, to the 
extent director compensation includes stock, the board’s own 
interest dictates eventual distribution.  As discussed above, these 
two safeguards do not protect the tax authority. 
Mandatory dividends require firms to periodically distribute 
a portion of their earnings to shareholders.  Generally, 
mandatory dividends are found in jurisdictions where control 
rights are otherwise weak.137  Shareholders in a firm that must 
distribute its earnings as dividends are protected from earnings 
being siphoned off for the benefit of other interest holders.  The 
cost of mandatory dividends is the same as their benefit—they 
relieve directors of the choice of whether and when to distribute 
earnings.  In the absence of mandatory dividends, earnings may 
be distributed or reinvested in the firm at the discretion of 
 
135 For examples of scholarship advocating a shift to credits in the context of 
personal taxation, see Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The 
Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 24–25 (2006); Daniel Shaviro, 
The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 
U. CHI. L. REV. 405, 409–10 (1997).  
136 See United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 140 (1972) (“Even where there are 
corporate earnings, the legal power to declare dividends is vested solely in the 
corporate board.”). 
137 Examples of countries with mandatory dividends include Brazil, Chile, 
Columbia, Ecuador, Greece, and Uruguay. See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and 
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1132 (1998) (discussing results that suggest “that 
mandatory dividends are indeed a remedial legal protection for shareholders who 
have relatively few other legal rights”). 
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directors.138  Mandatory dividends allow reinvestment but vest 
discretion with shareholders who may not know the 
opportunities facing the firm as well as its directors.  In 
jurisdictions where shareholder democracy and the market for 
management pose weak incentives for directors to look out for 
the interests of shareholders, divesting directors of discretion is 
less likely to injure shareholders.  Where directors are fastidious 
guardians of shareholders’ interests, the same will not be true.  
Thus adding mandatory dividends to an already robust package 
of control rights may do more harm than good.   
A mandatory dividend is the primary control right enjoyed 
by the U.S. tax authority.  As already observed, the Treasury 
does not participate in the election of directors, though law could 
be altered so it would; the Treasury cannot sell its tax receipts to 
those that could maximize their value, another legal artifact; and 
the Treasury does not incent directors or officers to maximize tax 
liability, again, a choice by those who write the law.  Instead, the 
tax authority relies on firms periodically reporting their taxable 
income and remitting a share of it.139  As discussed below, this 
system is critically sensitive to firms misreporting and 
manipulating earnings.  To minimize misreporting, the tax 
authority benefits from extensive disclosure rights, well in excess 
of those enjoyed by shareholders. 
The design of the mandatory dividend that benefits the tax 
authority differs from the basic design used to protect 
shareholders.  The difference is that the percentage of earnings 
that must be distributed to the tax authority is based on how the 
firm earns its income.  For example, tax credits for certain 
production processes deemed to be environmentally friendly 
effectively lower firms’ tax rates whereas especially high tax 
rates imposed on dispositions of wetlands effectively raise firms’ 
tax rates.140  By basing the mandatory dividend on the character  
 
 
138 See Jensen, supra note 26 (explaining management’s incentives to retain 
earnings rather than subject itself to investor discipline by relying on external 
financing). 
139 Every corporation is required to annually report and pay its tax liability. 
I.R.C. § 6151(a) (2006) (requiring payment of tax at the time of filing a return); id. 
§ 6072(b) (requiring every corporation to file a return on the fifteenth day of the 
third month following the end of its fiscal year).   
140 See id. §§ 45, 48 (favoring wind farms); id. § 1257(a)–(b) (disfavoring sales of 
wetlands).  
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of the production process, the tax authority balances revenue 
raising with regulatory goals without injecting itself into 
corporate governance. 
E. Disclosure Rights 
Disclosure rights are held by both the tax authority and 
shareholders,141 albeit, to different extents.  Disclosure due to the 
tax authority includes the filing of periodic tax returns142 and 
where the tax authority chooses to audit a company, “[f]or the 
purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a 
return where none has been made[, or] determining the liability 
of any person for any internal revenue tax,” the Treasury has 
rights to “examine any books, papers, records, or other data 
which may be relevant or material to such inquiry . . . [,] to 
summon . . . any officer or employee of such [company, and 
to] . . . take such testimony of the person concerned, under 
oath.”143  The rights to information enjoyed by the tax authority 
as auditor are broader than the rights granted to shareholders.144  
While the Treasury has access to all relevant “books, papers, 
records, or other data,” which presumably includes all the 
financial records available to shareholders, the Treasury may 
also question company executives—a power shareholders do not 
enjoy.145  Several explanations may be proposed for this 
difference.  For example, allowing any shareholder to summon 
management to interrogation may paralyze the operations of the 
 
141 See supra Part I.B.2. 
142 See id. § 6001 (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury “to make such 
returns, render such statements, or keep such records, as the Secretary deems 
sufficient to show whether or not such person is liable for tax under this title”); id. 
§ 6011 (obligating taxpayers to provide information that may be requested in tax 
returns); id. § 6012(a) (requiring corporations to file tax returns). 
143 Treas. Reg. § 301.7602-1(a)–(b) (2007). 
144 It may be argued that when shareholders perform the equivalent of an audit 
by suing the firm for fraud under Rule 10b-5, discovery affords them comparable 
access to information. An audit, however, is not predicated on a showing of 
malfeasance that passes a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“FRCP”) section 12(b)(6) and does not expose the IRS to potential liability under 
FRCP section 11. 
145 The Treasury is authorized to force shareholders to disclose certain suspect 
transactions and has used this authority to require disclosure of reportable 
transactions, listed transactions, and intermediary transactions. See Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.6011-4(b)(1) (reportable transactions); id. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (“listed transactions”); 
I.R.S. Notice 2001-16, 2001-1 C.B. 730; I.R.S. Notice 2008-111, 2008-51 I.R.B. 1299 
(transactions with intermediaries to accomplish tax shelters). 
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firm.146  Also, unlike the tax authority, shareholders may rely on 
corporate democracy, the market for control, and the market for 
management to incent a desirable level of disclosure indirectly.  
Because the tax authority does not have recourse for these 
alternate means of inducing directors and officers to look out for 
its interests, it must mandate desirable behaviors and rely on 
penalties to produce compliance.147 
F. Fiduciary Duties and Anti-Avoidance Doctrines148 
Another difference between shareholders and the tax 
authority is that the latter does not benefit from fiduciary duties.  
Under direction of directors and officers, firms spend money to 
reduce their tax liability and increase after-tax returns to 
shareholders, who typically, through share-based compensation, 
include directors and management.149  A fiduciary diverting 
assets from shareholders to line her own pockets is in breach of 
the duty of loyalty.150  There is no similar law that holds directors 
and officers liable for purposefully diverting the tax authority’s  
 
 
 
 
 
146 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 53, at 2029–42 (describing the history of 
exclusion of shareholder proposals relating to a “company’s ordinary business 
operations” from proxy statements under Rule 14a-8).  
147 See Anup Malani & Albert Choi, Are Non-Profit Firms Simply For-Profits in 
Disguise? Evidence from Executive Compensation in the Nursing Home Industry 1–
2 (Sept. 26, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=617362 (providing evidence that because nonprofit firms cannot provide 
incentive compensation to executives, they rely on the threat of termination to 
induce managerial effort).  
148 Subsequent to the writing of this Article, anti-avoidance doctrines were 
codified in I.R.C. section 7701(o) (West 2011). Though the substance of the ensuing 
discussion is unaffected, the codification obviates much of the case law relied on. 
149 See How-Powered Incentives, supra note 127, at 145–46; Weisbach, supra 
note 100, at 225 (“A blanket statement that we should get rid of tax 
lawyers . . . clearly would be too broad . . . [but] we should not kid ourselves that tax 
planning generally is productive (or is even merely worthless).”); Lawrence H. 
Summers, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Tackling the Growth of Corporate Tax 
Shelters, Remarks to the Federal Bar Association (Feb. 28, 2000), 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ls421.htm. 
150 See Willard ex rel. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 
515 S.E.2d 277, 287 (Va. 1999). 
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share of the residual to shareholders.151  Whether this difference 
is justified and what the alternatives are is the subject of this 
Subpart.152 
Presently, the tax authority is not left wholly unprotected 
from intentional manipulation of taxable income.  A set of “anti-
avoidance” doctrines work to prevent taxpayers from taking 
advantage of unintended rate differentials.153  As explained 
above, certain activities are taxed at higher rates than others.154  
Some of these differences are the product of conscious decisions 
by Congress to subsidize behaviors—for example, wind farmers 
 
151 See Donald L. Korb, Shelters, Schemes, and Abusive Transactions: Why 
Today’s Thoughtful U.S. Tax Advisors Should Tell Their Clients to “Just Say No”, in 
TAX PLANNING FOR DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, JOINT VENTURES 
& OTHER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 2009, at 975, 979 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning, 
Course Handbook Series No. 19,889). 
152 David A. Weisbach provides a framework for assessing incremental anti-
avoidance measures that compares their net benefit—including deadweight loss to 
the avoidance of the incremental measure—to their administrative cost. David A. 
Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax-Avoidance Doctrines, 4 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 88, 88 (2002). It could be argued that extending fiduciary duties has low net 
benefits or high administrative costs. This argument poses what is essentially an 
empirical question. That said, it is hard to explain why the net benefit from 
extending fiduciary duties to the tax authority should be lower than the benefit of 
extending them to shareholders. Furthermore, once courts have developed a doctrine 
and had practice in its application, it seems unlikely that the administrative costs of 
claims brought by the tax authority would exceed the administrative costs of claims 
by private litigants. On first pass, it seems more appropriate to extend these 
doctrines to benefit the tax authority than install them to benefit shareholders in 
the first place. Conversely, if these doctrines are not efficient if applied to the tax 
authority, they should not exist at all. 
153 Though on its face the doctrine is as applicable to a taxpayer who takes 
advantage of purposeful tax subsidies, in practice, it is not applied where the tax 
preference is blatantly intentional. Tax avoidance doctrines do not threaten the 
cumquat farmer cum wind farmer who made the switch to harvest tax credits, 
though she may have sacrificed pretax income solely to reap the private benefit of 
the tax credits. Leaving extreme cases aside, judicial power to determine tax 
treatment through tax avoidance doctrines becomes less certain. Courts have 
discretion to construe statutes where there is ambiguity and to produce interstitial 
common law. Courts do not have discretion where a statute unambiguously governs 
the conduct in question. Application of anti-avoidance doctrine, therefore, has to be 
predicated on statutory uncertainty; in other words, as a threshold matter a court 
must find that the statute does not govern the taxpayer’s conduct or that there is an 
ambiguity as to the appropriate taxation of the conduct. See, e.g., Marvin A. 
Chirelstein, Learned Hand’s Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 
440, 472–73 (1968) (summarizing the evolution of Learned Hand’s decisions in the 
area of tax avoidance, specifically, how they came to balance literal application of 
the Tax Code with the enforcement of the implicit legislative purpose of preventing 
tax avoidance). 
154 See supra Part II.D.  
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qualify for tax credits unavailable to cumquat farmers.155  Other 
differences may be products of underspecification in the Tax 
Code.156  Congresspersons cannot foresee every structure for 
earning or losing income.  Statutory ambiguities threaten the tax 
authority, as equityholder, when they allow taxpayers to exploit 
unintended rate differentials. 
Tax avoidance doctrines157 generally disqualify taxpayers 
from favorable treatment where the taxpayer’s conduct is 
directed to minimizing taxes.158  More specifically, anti-avoidance 
doctrines consist of a two-part test that evaluates whether 
(1) “the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other 
than obtaining tax benefits” and (2) the transaction posed “a 
reasonable possibility of [pretax] profit.”159  The first component 
 
155 See I.R.C. §§ 45, 48 (West 2011) (providing tax credits for wind farms but not 
cumquat farms); see also id. § 38 (providing credits, for example, to oil recovery 
projects, renewable electricity projects, ethanol production, nuclear power projects, 
railroad track maintenance, employer provided childcare, orphan drugs, and mine 
rescue training); id. § 162(c) (disallowing deductions for payments that are illegal 
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act). 
156 See Weisbach, supra note 152, at 93–94 (explaining anti-avoidance doctrines 
as a substitute for underspecification).  
157 Tax avoidance doctrines are referred to by various names. Compare Black & 
Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 441 (4th Cir. 2006) (testing whether a 
transaction is a “sham” and describing the test as composed of a subjective prong, 
which asks whether the transaction had a nontax business purpose and an objective 
prong, which asks whether the transaction posed a reasonable possibility of profit 
and thus had nontax economic substance), with Long Term Capital Holdings v. 
United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 171 (D. Conn. 2004) (referring to “economic 
substance analysis” as containing an objective and subjective prong). 
158 See Gilbert v. Comm’r, 248 F.2d 399, 411 (2d Cir. 1957) (Hand, J., dissenting) 
(“Except in rare instances statutes are written in general terms and do not 
undertake to specify all the occasions that they are meant to cover; and their 
‘interpretation’ demands the projection of their expressed purpose, upon occasions, 
not present in the minds of those who enacted them. The Income Tax Act imposes 
liabilities upon taxpayers based upon their financial transactions, and . . . [if] the 
taxpayer enters into a transaction that does not appreciably affect his beneficial 
interest except to reduce his tax, the law will disregard it . . . .”); Knetsch v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960) (adopting Learned Hand’s dissent); see also Frank 
Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583–84 (1978) (holding that a transaction 
will be respected if it is “compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities, 
is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-
avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached”). 
159 Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985); see Black 
& Decker, 436 F.3d at 441 (explaining that the sham transaction doctrine asks the 
court to “find . . . [(1)] that the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes 
other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and [(2)] that the 
transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit 
exists” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 
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is subjective, inquiring into the taxpayer’s motivations; the 
second component is objective, asking whether a taxpayer could 
reasonably expect a pretax profit from the transaction.  Because 
direct evidence of mental state is hard to come by, courts have 
relied on the latter component when evaluating the former, 
reasoning that if a reasonable expectation of profits did not 
otherwise exist, the taxpayer was motivated by tax 
minimization.160  As a result, though some courts formulate the 
test as conjunctive requiring both the subjective and objective 
components to be met and other courts phrase it as a multi-factor 
balancing test allowing one component to substitute for the 
other,161 effectively, the objective component is frequently 
dispositive.162   
The objective inquiry, which is sometimes referred to as the 
“economic substance” test, asks whether the transaction had a 
reasonable expectation of a pretax profit.163  If the answer is yes, 
the transaction will be respected and the favorable tax treatment 
granted.  A crucial question in applying the economic substance 
doctrine is how to define “profit.”  Courts almost exclusively 
adopt a naïve definition of profit, finding economic substance so 
long as the gross income from the transaction exceeds its direct 
costs.164  A more robust definition adopted by the District Court of 
Connecticut in Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States 
includes opportunity cost when measuring profit.165  
 
109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX 
EXPENDITURES 14–17 (Comm. Print 2005). 
160 See Black & Decker, 436 F.3d at 443 (explaining that the “ultimate 
determination of whether an activity is engaged in for profit is to be made . . .  by 
reference to [the] objective” component of the anti-avoidance test (internal citation 
and quotation marks omitted)). 
161 See Compaq Computer Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 781 
(5th Cir. 2001) (noting that some courts require the absence of both subjective and 
objective non-tax motives whereas others consider each a non-essential factor). 
162 See, e.g., Black & Decker, 436 F.3d at 443; Gilman v. Comm’r, 933 F.2d 143, 
149 (2d Cir. 1991) (describing the objective inquiry as “the most important 
element”). 
163 See, e.g., Gilman, 933 F.2d at 147. 
164 See ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 248–49 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(summarizing prior holdings that disqualified transactions as lacking economic 
substance, noting in each case that the transaction produced no more than a 
“pittance,” if any, net income).   
165 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 182 (D. Conn. 2004) (including over $1.2 million in 
foregone profits as a cost of the transaction when evaluating its “reasonably 
expected . . . overall return” and stating “forfeiture of . . . potential profits is 
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The naïve definition goes further than courts usually do 
when determining whether a fiduciary satisfied her duty of 
care.166  By inquiring into the substantive economic results of a 
transaction, courts exceed the strictly procedural examination 
used to test whether a fiduciary’s decision falls within her 
business judgment.167  That said, the naïve definition does not 
disqualify all those transactions that forego pretax profit to take 
advantage of unintentionally favorable tax rates.  The approach 
taken in Long Term Capital Holdings, though limited to the facts 
of that case, comes closer to forcing the taxpayer to simulate the 
conduct of a single owner who was entitled to both the after-tax 
income and tax receipts generated by a business.168   
Where a choice motivated by a favorable tax rate does not 
produce positive externalities, there is no economic justification 
for treating the taxpayer to the favorable tax rate.169  Whether 
there is a legal justification is ultimately a matter of statutory 
application.170  To the extent the applicable statutes—filtered 
through the relevant administrative actions—remain ambiguous, 
judges are free to develop methods of construction to achieve 
congressional intent.  An ideal, though impracticable, canon of 
construction would be that Congress does not write the Tax Code 
to give taxpayers the choice between two different tax rates.  
When a legislative ambiguity poses such a choice, that ambiguity 
should be resolved by foreclosing the treatment that results in 
lower pretax profit.  This ensures that tax does not incentivize 
private parties to forego social welfare.  So, for example, if a 
taxpayer can consummate a transaction in one of two ways, one 
of which will cost one hundred thousand dollars in legal fees and 
 
appropriately assessed against [the taxpayer] as a cost of the transaction that a 
prudent economic actor would have taken into account”). 
166 The business judgment rule does not relax the duty of care if the fiduciary is 
shown to lack good faith. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 705–06 (Del. 2009). 
167 As a result, the common law protects the tax authority both more and less 
than common shareholders. While managers and directors do not owe the Treasury 
a duty of loyalty, the substantive results of their business decisions may be 
challenged. See supra Part I.B.3. 
168 Long Term Capital Holdings, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 183 (noting that its inclusion 
of opportunity cost in the calculation of economic profit was appropriate “[u]nder the 
circumstances here”). 
169 See Weisbach, supra note 102, at 224. 
170 See David P. Hariton, Tax Benefits, Tax Administration, and Legislative 
Intent, 53 TAX LAW. 579, 581 (2000) (“To analyze the efficacy of [policy motivated tax 
benefits], however, as well as to develop and administer them properly, one must 
know what Congress was trying to exempt and why.”). 
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the other will cost twice that, the taxpayer should be subject to 
the tax rate applicable to the first alternative, whether or not 
that tax rate is the lower of the two.  It is doubtful, however, that 
outside the rare cases such as Long Term Capital Holdings, in 
which the pretax rates on the alternatives were known, such a 
canon could be operationalized. 
As an alternative to strengthening anti-avoidance doctrines, 
the duties of care and loyalty already imposed on fiduciaries 
could be extended so that they benefit the tax authority.171  
Courts could construe the Tax Code to provide for federal 
common law fiduciary duties.172  When management sacrifices 
pretax profit to benefit shareholders—a constituency that 
because of the widespread use of share-based compensation 
usually includes management—management commits the 
economic offense of a disloyal agent.  If the duty of loyalty to the 
tax authority were imposed on directors and officers, that duty 
would have to be tempered to ensure that congressionally 
intended avoidance would occur.  Where a statute 
unambiguously prescribed favorable tax treatment, such 
prescription could be treated as a carveout from fiduciary 
obligations that authorizes sacrifice of pretax for after-tax profits.  
The current regime imposes ethical, civil, and even criminal 
penalties on tax attorneys who assist in forms of tax evasion.  
Whether adding civil liability for directors and officers for tax 
avoidance is desirable depends on the equity and efficiency 
considerations.173  Efficiency concerns would require assessing 
whether deadweight loss would decrease or potentially increase 
as additional avoidance maneuvers were taken to avoid the new 
rule.  Efficiency may also be affected by the administrative and  
 
 
 
171 While bold, this proposition is not radical. Directors and officers of FDIC 
insured banks, for example, are subject to a federal duty of care. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) 
(2006 & Supp. II); see Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 216 (1997). 
172 See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) (“Whether 
to adopt state law or to fashion a nationwide federal rule is a matter of judicial 
policy ‘dependent upon a variety of considerations always relevant to the nature of 
the specific governmental interests and to the effects upon them of applying state 
law.’ ”). 
173 See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, 
and the Compaq Case, 88 TAX NOTES 221, 237 (2000) (using marginal efficiency of 
cost of funds to assess desirability of a change in the tax law). 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 851 (2010) 
896 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:851   
error costs from applying the rule.  The benefits, however, may 
be significant as officers ultimately have to approve if not initiate 
tax avoidance maneuvers.174  
One objection to extending the benefit of fiduciary duties to 
the tax authority distinguishes between shareholders and 
government based on the latter’s ability to write the tax law how 
it will.175  Roughly, this argument is that the tax authority can 
unilaterally add to its control rights.  This objection is not wholly 
satisfying because while theoretically Congress or the Treasury 
can always revise the Tax Code or Treasury Regulations, such 
revisions are not costless.  They require time and consideration 
on the part of legislators—agency personnel.  Furthermore, this 
argument (1) applies equally to anti-avoidance doctrines, which 
nevertheless exist and (2) does not address that shareholders are 
also free to change corporate bylaws.  The ability to unilaterally 
change the control rights accompanying an economic stake in a 
firm does not distinguish shareholders from the tax authority.  A 
second argument in the same vein observes that the tax 
authority can unilaterally change its economic rights by, for 
example, raising tax rates or disallowing deductions for interest.  
Such changes, however, affect all firms and not just those 
abusing the tax system.  Accordingly, the government cannot 
simply increase its economic rights to make up for weak control 
rights if it does not want to further raise tax rates on compliant 
firms.  That said, even if none of the differences between 
shareholders and the tax authority justify granting one but not 
the other the benefit of fiduciary duties, it does not necessarily 
follow that those benefits should be extended to the tax 
authority.  Perhaps, instead, fiduciaries should be absolved of all 
duties. 
III. THE RISK TAX 
Part II described the differences between the control rights 
enjoyed by the typical shareholder and those enjoyed by the tax 
 
174 See Corporate and Partnership Enforcement Issues Before the Subcomm. on 
Finance, 109th Cong. 5 (2006) (statement of Eileen J. O’Connor, Assistant Att’y 
Gen., Tax Division) (explaining that “[s]ophisticated tax professionals promote [tax 
shelters to] key officers in . . . business entities”). 
175 But see United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 910 (1995) (holding the 
United States liable for damages where legislation has the effect of breaching a 
contract executed among a federal agency and a private party). 
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authority.  Mandatory periodic dividends ensure the tax 
authority its share of earnings without suspending the 
congressionally intended influence of differential tax rates and 
without injecting the tax authority into the governance of the 
firm.  Disclosure obligations and anti-avoidance doctrines protect 
the tax authority from misrepresentation and manipulation, 
respectively, of the parameters that determine the amount of the 
dividend. 
Having recognized that the mandatory dividend is a design 
choice rather than an inevitable feature of a tax regime, this Part 
considers its consequences, specifically, the purchase the 
mandatory dividend provides Congress on taxpayers’ risk 
policies.176  Implementation of a mandatory dividend in favor of 
the tax authority poses a series of subtle administrative 
questions as to whether and how negative taxable income in a 
period should be allowed to offset positive taxable income in 
another period.  As discussed above, when a share is issued, the 
proceeds less transaction costs go to the firm.177  The residual to 
which shareholders have claims consists of that capital, 
augmented by retained earnings, decreased by dividends paid.  
When expenses from a period exceed gross income, the residual 
available to shareholders is reduced by the net loss.  Thus, in a 
period where income is negative, shareholders lose value.178  This 
is not necessarily the case for the tax authority.  The tax 
authority receives a share of taxable income so long as it is 
positive.  Subject to a taxpayer’s rights to “carryback” or 
“carryforward” its losses discussed below, negative taxable 
income does not affect the tax authority.179   
If tax liability for a given year were calculated without any 
reference to income in other years, the tax authority would bear 
no downside:  If a year’s taxable income were positive, the tax 
 
176 These results are well known to the literature. See Mitchell A. Kane, Risk 
and Redistribution in Open and Closed Economies, 92 VA. L. REV. 867, 869 n.5 
(2006) (reviewing literature). 
177 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
178 The loss is bounded by shareholders’ initial investment in the firm, absent 
veil piercing. See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 418–19, 223 N.E.2d 6, 8–9, 
276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 588–89 (1966). 
179 See Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation 
and Risk-Taking, 58 Q. J. ECON. 388, 389 (1944) (“By imposing an income tax on the 
investor, the Treasury appoints itself as his partner, who will always share in his 
gains, but whose share in his losses will depend upon the investor’s ability to offset 
losses against other income.”). 
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authority would receive a share of that income; if a year’s taxable 
income were negative, the tax authority—unlike a shareholder—
would not lose a dime.  As is, however, the tax authority does 
partially share in the downside.  When a firm experiences 
negative taxable income, it may carry its losses back against 
taxable income from the two prior years by amending its returns 
from those years to deduct those losses.180  Excess losses may be 
carried forward to offset taxable income in the following twenty 
years. 
In the absence of carrybacks and carryforwards, firms would 
face incentives to reduce the volatility of their earnings.181  Being 
unable to offset losses in one period against gains in another, 
firms with higher earnings volatility would pay more in taxes in 
the fat years and no less in the lean years.  The incentives 
become apparent when comparing nominal after-tax returns of 
two hypothetical corporations subject to a 30% tax rate, shown in 
Table 3.a.  Each corporation initially has $100 in capital.  
Corporation X chooses to pursue a higher volatility project, which 
produces a 10% pretax loss half of the time and a 40% pretax 
gain the other half.  Corporation Y chooses a more conservative 
project, which produces a 10% pretax gain half the time and a 
20% pretax gain the other half.  Table 3.a summarizes the 
projects’ returns. 
Table 3.a: Pretax Rates of Return 
  Low High Expected 
Corp. X -10.00% 40.00% 15.00% 
Corp. Y 10.00% 20.00% 15.00% 
Based on these assumed parameters, the corporations’ 
pretax income, taxes, and after-tax income are shown in Tables 
3.b, 3.c, and 3.d, respectively. 
 
180 See I.R.C. § 172 (West 2011). It is worth emphasizing that—to the extent that 
tax accounting tracks firm cash flows—refunds on account of carrybacks are likely to 
be made during times a firm is cash starved and thus in danger of being unable to 
satisfy its obligations as they come due. Thus, carrybacks serve to cushion firms 
against bankruptcy.  
181 See Domar & Musgrave, supra note 4 (explaining that the increase of tax 
rates in the absence of complete loss sharing would theoretically have uncertain 
results, but “practical evidence would indicate that the investor is likely to shift in 
the direction of less risk”). 
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Table 3.b: Taxes Paid 
  Low High Expected 
Corp. X $90.00 $140.00 $115.00 
Corp. Y $110.00 $120.00 $115.00 
  
 Table 3.b shows what is not unexpected.  Two corporations 
equally capitalized and engaging in projects with the same 
average rate of return are expected to have the same income. 
Table 3.c: Taxes Paid 
  Low High Expected 
Corp. X $0.00 $12.00 $6.00 
Corp. Y $3.00 $6.00 $4.50 
 
Table 3.c illustrates the asymmetry produced when the tax 
authority is insulated from any downside.  Note that Corporation 
X is expected to pay higher taxes than Corporation Y because 
while the two have the same expected rate of return, Corporation 
X pays additional taxes in the high return scenario but its losses 
in the low return scenario do not affect its tax liability.  The 
asymmetry is reflected in Table 3.c, which shows the 
corporations’ after-tax position at the end of the first period, 
reflecting an additional $1.50 in after-tax wealth. 
Table 3.d: After-tax Positions 
  Low High Expected 
Corp. X $90.00 $128.00 $109.00 
Corp. Y $107.00 $114.00 $110.50 
 
Obviously, the figures above are driven by the initial 
parameters—for example, initial capitalization, the rates of 
return, and the tax rate—but the observation that absent 
carryovers, taxpayers will prefer an income distribution with a 
smaller average loss in favor of one with a greater average loss, 
where the two distributions are otherwise equal, remains true 
across all initial parameters.182   
 
182 See Green & Talmor, supra note 4, at 1102 (proving that ceteris paribus, the 
least volatile stream of pretax income will produce the highest after-tax return in a 
progressive tax system). Though generally depressing equityholders’ appetites for 
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Carryovers expose the tax authority to the downside because 
they allow the taxpayer to decrease its taxable income in those 
years in which it is positive by losses from other years.  Thus, 
carryovers reduce incentives to avoid projects that pose higher 
average losses.  If Corporation X could carryforward its losses, its 
$10 loss in the low return scenario would reduce taxable income 
in subsequent periods by $10.  Assuming tax rates remained 
constant, the nominal after-tax value of the $10 deduction is $3—
the product of the deduction and the tax rate.  Thus, the after-tax 
wealth of Corporation X in the low scenario increases by $3 to 
$93, and its expected wealth increases by half that amount183 to 
equal Corporation Y’s expected wealth. 
Carryforwards do not wholly neutralize the incentive to 
decrease earnings volatility once the time-value of money is 
accounted for.184  Assuming a constant positive discount rate, it 
can be shown that the net present after-tax value decreases with 
the average pretax loss of an income distribution though its 
pretax mean remains constant.  This can be illustrated by 
returning to the example of Corporations X and Y.  Table 3.e 
reviews the returns to the two corporations in each of the 
scenarios for the first year, showing the pretax returns, taxes 
paid, and after-tax returns as the set of columns under YEAR 1.  
Assuming that the after-tax proceeds from the first year are 
reinvested, the columns under YEAR 2 show the pretax returns, 
taxes paid, and after-tax returns that would be received in year 
two given that those proceeds earn a 15% return.185 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
risk, if a firm is already insolvent, taxes may actually increase risk appetites. See id. 
at 1096.    
183 Half of $3.00—$1.50. 
184 It should be noted that the preceding paragraph spoke in terms of the 
deduction’s nominal value. 
185 For example, the pretax figure in the low scenario for Corporation X reflects 
the results of investing $90 at a 15% rate of return. 
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Table 3.e: Effect of Discount Rate 
                  
  YEAR 1   YEAR 2   
  Pretax   
  Low High Expected   Low High Expected   
Corp. X $90.00 $140.00 $115.00   $103.50 $147.20 $125.35   
Corp. Y $110.00 $120.00 $115.00   $123.05 $131.10 $127.08   
                  
  Tax   
  Low High Expected   Low High Expected   
Corp. X $0.00 $12.00 $6.00   $1.05 $5.76 $3.41   
Corp. Y $3.00 $6.00 $4.50   $4.82 $5.13 $4.97   
                  
  
 
After-tax   
  Low High Expected   Low High Expected   
Corp. X $90.00 $128.00 $109.00   $102.45 $141.44 $121.95   
Corp. Y $107.00 $114.00 $110.50   $118.24 $125.97 $122.10   
                  
 
Note that a 15% return in the year two produces a higher 
gain—$13.50186—on the $90 invested by Corporation X in the low 
return scenario than the amount Corporation X lost in the 
preceding year—$10.00—so the full carryforward is used up.187  
Notwithstanding the full deduction of the carryforward, 
Corporation X receives less in after-tax income than Corporation 
Y.188  The intuition for this is that a $1 decrease in income is 
shared by shareholders and the tax authority so long as the 
resulting income is positive, but a $1 increase in loss is borne 
solely by shareholders until such time as the firm returns to  
 
 
 
186 Fifteen percent of $90 or $13.50. 
187 The assumption that returns in the second year are positive and sufficient to 
use up the full carryforward from the first year is conservative. If, for example, 
returns in the second year formed the same distribution as in the first, there would 
be a 50% likelihood that the $10 carryforward from the first year would go unused 
and an additional $9 carryforward is generated. As this paragraph explains, 
carryforwards constitute interest free loans from tax payers to the tax authority.   
188 Again, the figures are a function of initial assumptions. The $0.15 disparity 
between expected pre-tax earnings of corporations X and Y is equal to the cost of 
capital of Corporation’s X expected deduction ($10.00 x .50 x 0.3 x 1.15 =) $1.725.  
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positive income.  And at such time, the shareholders are not 
made whole for the time value of money that was used to cover 
the tax authority’s share of the losses.189   
To unpack the intuition, let us compare the consequence on 
after-tax income of the marginal dollar of costs when income is 
positive to the marginal dollar of costs when income is negative.  
In the first case, the marginal dollar of costs reduces after-tax 
income only by “1-t” of a dollar where “t” is the tax rate, because 
but for that loss, the corporation would have had a dollar more in 
pretax income but paid “t” of that dollar to the tax authority.  In 
the second case, however, the marginal dollar of costs initially 
reduces after-tax income by the full dollar—assuming that the 
loss cannot be carried back against prior years’ income.  If and 
when a period arrives in which the corporation returns to 
positive income, that dollar of cost will be deducted from the 
period’s gains.  But for that deduction, the corporation would 
have paid tax on an additional dollar of income, or “t” of that 
dollar.  Thus, eventually, the nominal after-tax loss attributable 
to the marginal dollar of costs becomes “1-t” of a dollar, whether 
the costs are incurred while the firm is in the black or the red.  In 
real terms, however, the after-tax loss is greater when incurred 
while in the red because between incurring the full dollar in cost 
and being refunded “t” dollars, the taxpayer loses returns on 
those “t” dollars.   
Thus, despite carryforwards, equity holders face a “risk tax,” 
which leaves shareholders with higher after-tax income if the 
firm engages in the project with the minimum average loss given 
a set of projects with equal expected pretax income.190  It is 
important to note that the risk tax is produced by a difference in 
treatment between a marginal dollar of cost that reduces positive 
income and a marginal dollar of cost that increases loss.  It is for 
this reason that the risk tax affects taxpayers’ attitudes towards 
 
189 This assumes: (1) that taxable income measures real economic income; 
(2) that carrybacks are insufficient to fully soak up the losses incurred; and (3) a 
constant tax rate. 
190 See Green & Talmor, supra note note 4, at 1108 (“The incentive effects of the 
government’s tax option may be mitigated by the firm’s ability to carry losses 
forward and back across periods. These opportunities fall short of a fully 
proportional tax for two reasons. First, the time-value of money implies taxes paid 
today are more valuable than rebates received tomorrow. Second, losses in future 
periods are uncertain, so if losses can only be carried back a finite number of years, 
there is always some probability that the taxes will never be refunded.”). 
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average loss rather than volatility generally.  Nevertheless, 
purely as shorthand, the effect will be referred to as a tax on risk 
or volatility.191   
Unlike carryforwards, which require shareholders to wait 
until a period of positive income before they can share a period’s 
losses with the tax authority, carrybacks force the tax authority 
to immediately participate in a net loss.  Effectively, a regime 
that allows a firm to carryback its losses X years, delays the 
mandatory dividend X years.  On first pass, this result may 
suggest that the insufficiency of carryforwards to compensate a 
taxpayer for losses is academic.  As a practical matter, 
carrybacks are insufficient to make firms risk neutral for two 
reasons.192  First, they only apply to established firms that have 
had income in their prior years.  Thus, a firm choosing its 
original projects must look to carryforwards to refund startup 
costs from its initial years.  Second, the carryback period is short: 
two years in the U.S. and zero years in many other countries.193  
Thus a firm with a long history of strong earnings that incurs net 
losses for several years may find itself unable to do anything with 
those losses except wait for the storm to pass.  Even an 
established firm in choosing between projects, therefore, will take 
into account the possibility of a string of bad years that force it to 
rely on carryforwards.194   
Having unpacked the effects of carryforwards and 
carrybacks on firms’ appetites for risk, we can now describe the 
set of policy instruments that mandatory dividends provide.  Just 
as Congress can change the minimum pretax return of projects a 
taxpayer will engage in by changing the tax rate, Congress can 
 
191 Again, it is worth remembering that some risk is diversifiable while some 
risk may be systemic. See supra note 24. 
192 See David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 TAX. L. REV. 1, 34 
(2004) (noting that “loss limitations often mean that losses cannot be fully deducted, 
which in turn means that losses effectively are taxed at a different rate than are 
gains”). 
193 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, supra note 124 (summarizing tax 
regime in each covered country, and where a country provides for carrybacks, 
explaining their period and applicable limitations, if any). Countries that do not 
provide carrybacks include Australia, id. at 24, Austria, id. at 36, Belgium, id. at 69, 
China, id. at 158, Costa Rica, id. at 181, Croatia, id. at 189, Cyprus, id. at 196, 
Czech Republic, id. at 205, and Ecuador, id. at 227. 
194 See Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and 
Regulation, 9 YALE J. REG. 119, 134 (1992) (noting that such tax benefits may 
encourage mergers, specifically, that a “merger effectively provides coinsurance by 
diversifying expected cash flows, so that deductions will not be wasted”). 
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change the maximum average loss of a project a taxpayer will 
engage in by changing the carryover period.195  To increase risk 
tolerance, Congress can extend the carryback period one year.  To 
increase it a little less, Congress can instead extend the 
carryforward period a year or increase the carryback while 
decreasing the carryforward.196  But playing with the carryover 
periods is not the sole means to influencing taxpayers’ attitudes 
to risk.  Congress can make losses more expensive by increasing 
the tax rate.  This is evident by returning to where the intuition 
for the risk tax is presented.  Note that the tax authority defers 
sharing in “t” cents of each dollar of loss.  The greater the tax 
rate, the greater the loss the tax authority defers sharing in, and 
thus the more expensive the marginal dollar of loss for the 
shareholders.  This means that an increase in U.S. tax rates has 
two countervailing effects.  First, as has been amply discussed, 
given the global competition for capital, the increase will prompt 
U.S. corporations to choose projects with higher pretax returns to 
remain attractive to capital.197  The shift will be at the expense of 
additional risk.  Second, the increase in the tax rate increases the 
taxpayer’s exposure to downside.  This makes additional risk less 
attractive, thus dampening the first effect.198  In all likelihood, 
 
195 Cf. Dale W. Jorgenson, Capital Theory and Investment Behavior, 53 AM. 
ECON. REV. 247, 248 (1963) (modeling and testing effects of changes in tax rates on 
the selection of projects by firms); Mervyn A. King, Taxation and the Cost of Capital, 
41 REV. ECON. STUD. 21, 34 (1974). 
196 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“ARRA”) extended 
the loss carryback period from two years to five years but did so only for small 
businesses. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, P.L. 111-5 
§ 1211(a) (Feb. 17, 2009). Whether the resulting transfer from taxpayers to 
unsuccessful small businesses and the additional incentives for risk taking are 
justifiable is a question for policymakers to consider. See Daniel Shaviro, The 2008–
09 Financial Crisis: Implications for Income Tax Reform 12–16 (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law, 
Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 09-35, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1442089. 
197 See Weisbach, supra note 192, at 6–7 (explaining why it is relatively easy for 
even uninformed investors to adjust for changes in the tax regime by looking at 
after-tax returns). See generally Daniel Shaviro, Some Observations Concerning 
Multi-Jurisdictional Tax Competition, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Daniel Esty & Damien Gerardin eds., 
Oxford 2001). 
198 In a progressive tax system, it is volatility of earnings as well as average loss 
that is taxed. See Green & Talmor, supra note 4, at 1096 (“It is shown that the firm’s 
objective function assumes the form of its before-tax net present value less the value 
of a call option representing its tax liability. The convex ‘shape’ of this liability leads 
to risk-averse behavior.”). Given two firms with identical average pretax earnings, 
more of the earnings of the one with higher volatility will be taxed at the higher 
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the second effect will outweigh the first.199  If the net effect can be 
determined, the adjustment of the carryover period or the tax 
rate allows the government to dial risk taking across the 
economy.   
CONCLUSION 
There are at least two stages to legal evolution.  First, an 
alternative to the status quo must be articulated.  Second, the 
desirability of that alternative should be assessed.  This Article 
began by observing that the tax authority’s economic interest in 
corporations is fundamentally similar to that of shareholders, yet 
its control rights are extremely different.  It used that 
observation to open up a space of design possibilities for revising 
how the tax authority is protected from corporate exploitation of 
unintended rate differentials.  It accompanied the proposals with 
objections to them, consistently encountering the tradeoff 
between increasing revenues and decreasing desired behavioral 
shifts.  Though this Article attempted to identify some of the 
consequences to its proposals, it did not attempt to net these 
consequences.  Thus it offers no conclusions regarding the 
desirability of the proposals.  Having broadened the design space 
of tax regimes, it leaves it to subsequent scholarship to assess 
whether any of the proposed designs are worth adopting.   
What this Article does do, however, is show that there won’t 
be easy answers.  While it remains agnostic as to the right 
devices with which to balance regulatory and revenue raising 
goals, this Article means to leave no question that there is a 
tradeoff.  Any proposal that claims to increase the tax base by 
reducing the incidence of regulated parties taking advantage of 
incentives should be scrutinized for its effect on compliance; and 
reciprocally, any proposal that claims to increase compliance 
should be scrutinized for its effect on revenues.   
Finally, it is worth noting that the tradeoff between revenue 
and compliance itself may simply pose a question of means 
rather than ends.  After all, government revenue is ultimately 
used to effect government policy.  If that policy is effected 
directly—by the government raising money and then spending it 
 
rates. While U.S. corporations face only limited rate progressivity, the earnings of 
U.S. limited liability companies, partnerships, and other entities that receive pass 
through tax treatment are effectively taxed at the rates facing their interestholders.   
199 See Domar & Musgrave, supra note 4.  
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on employees that produce the work it wants to done—that is 
simply a substitute for those goals being accomplished indirectly, 
by offering private parties incentives to do the desired work on 
their own.  Viewed in the abstract, a government simply has 
policy goals, and how it goes about achieving those goals is a 
question of engineering.   
 
